

# Reframing Kripke: Resolution Matrix Semantics with Indeterminate Truth Values

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## 1. Introduction

This paper introduces non-relational Resolution Matrix Semantics (RMS) as a novel framework for constructing systems of modal logic, offering an alternative to the relational semantics of possible worlds developed by Saul Kripke. The concept of substantive semantics, pioneered by Y. Ivlev [3], serves as a foundational inspiration for this approach. Ivlev suggested defining modal operators based on informal reasoning tailored to their area of applicability—such as epistemology, ethics, or physics—rather than formal relational structures, introducing the notion of an interpretation quasi-function that assigns truth values in a context-dependent manner [3, 4]. His modal systems, while lacking an obvious correspondence to Kripkean systems, offered an intriguing informal, substantive perspective that prioritized practical interpretation over abstract world-relations.

Building on this idea, we develop RMS using an augmented 4-valued structure—necessary truth (tn), contingent truth (tc), contingent false (fc), and necessary false (fn)—augmented by "indeterminate" truth values "t" (either tn or tc), "f" (either fc or fn), and t/f (fully indeterminate). The general approach to constructing a modal system with RMS involves defining an interpretation function that assigns both "determinate" truth values (tn, tc, fc, fn) and "indeterminate" truth values (t, f, or t/f) to formulas.

A formula is valid in RMS if and only if it takes tn or t (t is indeterminate truth value) under all truth value assignments of its variables, providing a substantive, truth-value-based semantics distinct from Kripke's relational models.

The most compelling question driving this work is how reframing Kripkean modal logics—such as K, KD, KT, KT4 (S4), and KT45 (S5)—within RMS illuminates new perspectives in both their construction and application. We build analogues of these systems, termed Km, KDm, KTm, S4m, and S5m, to explore how a truth-value-centric approach reveals alternative insights into modal reasoning, potentially

enhancing its utility across diverse domains. Based on RMS, we propose a tableau (truth tree) method tailored for validating formulas, leveraging the finite set of truth values to systematically test for validity by exploring whether a formula can take invalid values. This method adapts the classical propositional logic tableau approach to modal contexts, enhancing its practicality for RMS-based systems. Furthermore, RMS opens avenues for advanced implementations in modal logic. RMS can support applications in deontic logic (modeling obligation and permission), epistemic logic (representing knowledge and belief), and other domains such as philosophy, technology, and science, where indeterminate or context-dependent truth values are prevalent.

## 2. From Kripke's Worlds to Truth Value Semantics

Kripkean modal systems, developed by Saul Kripke [6], provide a standard framework for modal logic using relational semantics. These systems are based on a structure known as a Kripke frame, defined as a pair  $(W, R)$ , where  $W$  is a non-empty set of possible worlds and  $R$  is a subset of  $W \times W$ , an accessibility relation between worlds. A Kripke model extends this frame to a triple  $(W, R, V)$ , where  $V$  is a valuation function assigning truth values (true or false) to propositional variables at each world [1].

In this semantics, modal operators  $\Box$  (necessity) and  $\Diamond$  (possibility) are interpreted as follows:

$\Box P$  is true at a world  $w$  in  $W$  if and only if  $P$  is true in all worlds  $v$  in  $W$  such that  $wRv$  (i.e.,  $v$  is accessible from  $w$ ).

$\Diamond P$  is true at  $w$  if and only if there exists at least one world  $v$  such that  $wRv$  and  $P$  is true at  $v$ .

The properties of  $R$  (e.g., reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry) determine the specific modal system, such as S4 or S5. Kripkean models excel due to their reliance on relational semantics, which is particularly powerful when applied to scientific, philosophical, or other aspects of reality that involve relations. For example, in epistemology, the accessibility relation can represent epistemic accessibility, where one world is accessible from another if and only if it is consistent with an agent's knowledge. In physics, it might model causal relationships between events across possible worlds, such as in discussions of determinism or quantum mechanics. In ethics, it can reflect deontic relations, where worlds are accessible based on what is permissible under certain moral constraints. These relational structures allow Kripkean semantics to flexibly capture dependencies and interactions across contexts.

However, in some cases, a truth value approach like RMS can be more applicable and productive than a relational one. For instance, in decision theory, assigning truth values directly to propositions about outcomes (e.g., "this choice is necessarily beneficial" or "this outcome is contingently true") might simplify modeling without requiring an explicit relational structure. Similarly, in artificial intelligence, where systems often process propositions with graded or uncertain truth (e.g., "this sensor reading is likely true"), a truth value-based system can streamline computations over a relational framework. Since RMS works with truth values directly, Kripkean modal logics can potentially be generalized within RMS to incorporate infinite truth values, akin to fuzzy logic, where truth is a continuum rather than a binary or finite set.

Moreover, this shift to truth values in RMS opens the door to exploring modal logics with truth value gaps (where a proposition may lack a truth value) and gluts (where a proposition may be both true and false). Notable works in this area include Kleene's three-valued logic [5], which introduces an "undefined" value, and Priest's paraconsistent logic [9], such as his Logic of Paradox (LP), which allows for truth value gluts to handle contradictions. These systems are particularly relevant in contexts like vague predicates (e.g., "this heap is large") or paradoxical statements (e.g., the liar paradox), where traditional binary or relational semantics may falter.

The RMS approach is also interesting in its own right because it inspires consideration of "indeterminate" truth values, such as "necessary truth or contingent truth" (t) or even "fully indeterminate truth value" (t/f). These concepts allow us to model situations where precision is elusive yet modal distinctions remain relevant. We encounter a scenario where the precise value is indeterminate yet constrained within a specific domain. This does not violate the concept of a function, as it consistently selects a single value from its range (for example, truth value t - "either  $t_n$  or  $t_c$ ") for each input, albeit one that "wanders" between  $t_n$  and  $t_c$ . Such situations arise across various domains. In quantum mechanics, for instance, the state of a particle's spin might be necessarily true ( $t_n$ ) in a deterministic context or contingently true ( $t_c$ ) due to superposition until measurement, yet always one or the other. In artificial intelligence, a decision-making algorithm assessing sensor data (e.g., "the obstacle is ahead") might assign  $t_n$  when corroborated by multiple sources or  $t_c$  based on partial evidence, with the truth value fixed per instance but varying by case. Similarly, in legal reasoning, a statute's applicability could be necessarily true under clear precedent ( $t_n$ ) or contingently true in ambiguous cases ( $t_c$ ), reflecting context-dependent certainty within a bounded range. These examples illustrate how such fuzzy yet singular truth assignments model real-world

phenomena where precision is elusive but categorical limits apply, aligning with the substantive semantics proposed by RMS.

For a more detailed exploration of RMS, which builds on these ideas by shifting focus from relations to a substantive truth value framework, we turn to the next section.

### **3. Intuitive Justification for Matrix Definitions of Negation and Implication Using Countable Sequences of Truth Values**

In this chapter, we explore an intuitive foundation for the matrix definitions of negation ( $\neg$ ) and disjunction ( $\vee$ ) in RMS semantics by imagining truth values as countable sequences. These sequences reflect the truth of a proposition across an ordered set of possible worlds, where the first element represents "our world" (the actual world), and the subsequent elements form a countable sequence of worlds reachable from it. This perspective offers a way to justify the matrix definitions without relying on relational Kripkean semantics, instead grounding them in a substantive, truth value-based framework. We define the four core truth values—necessary truth (tn), contingent truth (tc), contingent false (fc), and necessary false (fn)—as sequences, then use this model to shed light on how negation and disjunction behave, particularly highlighting cases where disjunction yields the indeterminate value "t" (either tn or tc).

#### **3.1 Truth Values as Countable Sequences**

Imagine each truth value as an infinite sequence of binary values (t for true, f for false), indexed by worlds:  $w_0$  (our world),  $w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n, \dots$ , where  $w_0$  is the actual world and  $w_1, w_2, \dots$  are worlds accessible from it in some ordered way. In these sequences, t and f are values understood in a classical bivalent logic manner, representing straightforward true or false assignments at each world.

We can define our four truth values intuitively as follows:

tn (necessary truth): The proposition is true in our world and every reachable world. So,  $tn = \langle t, t, t, t, \dots \rangle$ , capturing universal truth across all worlds.

tc (contingent truth): The proposition is true in our world but false in at least one other world. For simplicity, picture  $tc = \langle t, f, f, f, \dots \rangle$ , true in  $w_0$  but false elsewhere. (The pattern beyond  $w_0$  could vary, as long as there's at least one f.)

fc (contingent false): The proposition is false in our world but true in at least one other world. For example,  $fc = \langle f, t, t, t, \dots \rangle$ , false in  $w_0$  but true in some later worlds. (The tail can differ, but it needs at least one t.)

fn (necessary false): The proposition is false in our world and all reachable worlds, so  $fn = \langle f, f, f, f, \dots \rangle$ .

This sequence-based view captures the modal ideas of necessity and contingency in a straightforward way, focusing on truth patterns rather than explicit relations between worlds. The ordering  $tn > tc > fc > fn$  in our matrix semantics will naturally align with how these sequences behave under negation and implication, reflecting their relative "strength" in terms of truth consistency.

### 3.2 Sequence-Based Connectives

In Resolution Matrix Semantics (RMS), connectives are defined via a sequence model where propositional variables are assigned infinite sequences of t (true) or f (false) across worlds, with  $w_0$  as the actual world. These map to truth values:  $tn = \langle t, t, t, \dots \rangle$  (necessary truth),  $tc = \langle t, f, f, \dots \rangle$  (contingent truth),  $fc = \langle f, t, t, \dots \rangle$  (contingent false),  $fn = \langle f, f, f, \dots \rangle$  (necessary false). This non-relational approach adapts classical intuitions to modal contexts.

- **Negation ( $\neg$ ):** For  $p = \langle s_0, s_1, s_2, \dots \rangle$ ,  $\neg p = \langle \neg s_0, \neg s_1, \neg s_2, \dots \rangle$  ( $\neg t = f$ ,  $\neg f = t$ ). Thus,  $\neg tn = fn$  ( $\langle f, f, f, \dots \rangle$ , true everywhere becomes false everywhere),  $\neg tc = fc$  ( $\langle f, t, t, \dots \rangle$ , true in  $w_0$  and probably in some other worlds, flips to false),  $\neg fc = tc$  ( $\langle t, f, f, \dots \rangle$ , false in  $w_0$  and probably in some other worlds, becomes true),  $\neg fn = tn$  ( $\langle t, t, t, \dots \rangle$ , false everywhere turns true). This symmetrically swaps necessity and contingency around the true/false divide.

**Table 3.2a: Negation**

p	$\neg p$
tn	fn
tc	fc
fc	tc
fn	tn

- **Disjunction (V):** For  $p = \langle p_0, p_1, p_2, \dots \rangle$  and  $q = \langle q_0, q_1, q_2, \dots \rangle$ ,  $p \vee q = \langle p_0 \vee q_0, p_1 \vee q_1, p_2 \vee q_2, \dots \rangle$  ( $t \vee t = t$ ,  $t \vee f = t$ ,  $f \vee t = t$ ,  $f \vee f = f$ ). The result takes the "highest" consistent value ( $tn > tc > fc > fn$ ):

$$tn \vee tn = tn$$

$$tn \vee tc = tn$$

$$tc \vee tc = t \text{ } (<t, f, f, \dots> \text{ or } <t, t, t, \dots>, \text{ depending on overlap}),$$

$$tc \vee fc = t \text{ } (<t, f, f, \dots> \text{ or } <t, t, t, \dots>, \text{ depending on overlap}),$$

$$tc \vee fn = tc$$

$$fc \vee fc = fc$$

$$fc \vee fn = fc$$

$$fn \vee fn = fn$$

Indeterminacy (e.g.,  $tc \vee tc = t$ ) reflects variable world overlaps.

**Table 3.2b: Disjunction**

$p \vee q$	tn	tc	fc	fn
tn	tn	tn	tn	tn
tc	tn	t	t*	tc
fc	tn	t*	fc	fc
fn	tn	tc	fc	fn

\*) If  $q = \neg p$ , then  $p \vee q = tn$  (no tc). This follows from sequence representations of  $p$  and  $\neg p$

## 4. Resolution Matrix Semantics (RMS) for Modal Systems

In RMS, we use four truth values:  $t_n$ ,  $t_c$ ,  $f_c$ , and  $f_n$ , along with indeterminate truth values,  $t$ ,  $f$ , or  $t/f$ . Now, we introduce a system equivalent to the Kripkean system KT, called  $KT_m$  ("m" for matrix), based on RMS.

### 4.1 System $KT_m$

#### Language:

Propositional variables:  $p$ ,  $q$ , etc., representing basic propositions.

Standard logical connectives:  $\neg$  (negation),  $\wedge$  (conjunction),  $\vee$  (disjunction), and  $\rightarrow$  (implication).

The modal operator  $\Box$ , representing necessity.

Brackets: ( and ), used to group expressions and clarify the structure of formulas.

#### Definition of a well-formed formula

The set of well-formed formulas in  $KT_m$  is defined recursively as follows:

Basic propositions  $p$ ,  $q$  are formulas.

If  $p$  and  $q$  are formulas, then the following are also formulas:  $\neg p$ ,  $p \wedge q$ ,  $p \vee q$ ,  $p \rightarrow q$ .

If  $p$  is a formula, then  $\Box p$  is a formula.

These rules generate all permissible formulas in  $KT_m$ , allowing us to express both propositional and modal statements within the system.

Next, we define  $KT_m$ 's RMS using  $\neg$  and  $\rightarrow$  as primitives, with the truth values  $t_n$ ,  $t_c$ ,  $f_c$ , and  $f_n$ :

#### Negation ( $\neg$ )

The truth value of  $\neg p$  is determinate by reversing the order of the four truth values:

$p$	$\neg p$
$t_n$	$f_n$
$t_c$	$f_c$

fc	tc
fn	tn

### Implication ( $\rightarrow$ )

The definition of implication ( $p \rightarrow q$ ) in KTm can be formulated similarly to the definition of disjunction in Section 3.3, depending on the truth values of sequences for p and q across worlds. The results are presented in the table below.

$p \rightarrow q$	tn	tc	fc	fn
tn	tn	tc	fc	fn
tc	tn	t*	fc	fc
fc	tn	t	t*	tc
fn	tn	tn	tn	tn

\*) if  $p = q$  then tn (not tc)

The definitions for negation and implication involving indeterminate and mixed (determinate and indeterminate) truth values can be derived from the implication table for determinate values provided above. Simply apply all corresponding columns for an indeterminate truth value (e.g., tn and tc for t). The resulting tables for indeterminate values t and f are the same as in classical bivalent logic.

p	$\neg p$
t	f
f	t

$p \rightarrow q$	t	f
t	t	f
f	t	t



## Modal Operator ( $\Box$ )

In Kripke semantics, KT (also known as T) has a reflexive accessibility relation, meaning every world accesses itself. Thus, if a proposition  $p$  is necessarily true ( $\Box p$ ), it must be true in the actual world. In the sequence model,  $tn = \langle t, t, t, \dots \rangle$  reflects truth in our world ( $w_0$ ) and all reachable worlds, so  $\Box tn = t$  ( $tn$  or  $tc$ ) captures this necessity, allowing flexibility for interpretations. For  $tc = \langle t, f, f, \dots \rangle$ , truth holds in  $w_0$  but fails elsewhere, so  $\Box tc = f$  ( $fc$  or  $fn$ ) since necessity fails beyond the reflexive world. Similarly,  $fc = \langle f, t, t, \dots \rangle$  and  $fn = \langle f, f, f, \dots \rangle$  lack universal truth, so  $\Box fc = f$  and  $\Box fn = f$ , reflecting the absence of necessity across all worlds, including  $w_0$ .

The truth value of  $\Box p$  in  $KT_m$  is defined based on the value of  $p$ :

$p$	$\Box p$
$tn$	$t$
$tc$	$f$
$fc$	$f$
$fn$	$f$

Here, "t" and "f" do not represent the values of classical two-valued logic; instead, they are indeterminate truth values. "t" stands for "either  $tn$  or  $tc$ ," while "f" stands for "either  $fc$  or  $fn$ ."

Let  $A$  be a formula in the system under consideration, and let  $I$  denote an interpretation function that assigns truth values to formulas. The possible truth values are drawn from the set  $\{tn, tc, fc, fn, t, f, t/f\}$ , where  $t$  is "either  $tn$  or  $tc$ ",  $f$  is "either  $fc$  or  $fn$ ", and  $t/f$  stands for "either  $tn$  or  $tc$  or  $fc$  or  $fn$ ".

**The formula  $A$  is valid in the interpretation  $I$  if and only if it takes a determinate truth value  $tn$  or indeterminate truth value  $t$  under all truth value assignments of its variables (propositions).**

## 4.2 $KT_m$ (Kripkean System KT based on RMS semantics)

The system  $KT_m$  is defined with the following axioms and inference rules:

## Axioms:

Propositional Tautologies: All tautologies of classical propositional logic.

Distribution Axiom:  $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$ .

Reflexivity Axiom:  $\Box p \rightarrow p$ .

Inference Rules:

Modus Ponens: From  $p$  and  $p \rightarrow q$ , infer  $q$ .

Necessitation Rule: From  $p$ , infer  $\Box p$  (provided  $KT_m \vdash p$ ).

These axioms and rules define the syntactic structure of  $KT_m$ , which we will analyze in terms of its RMS properties in the following sections.

## Soundness Theorem

The system  $KT_m$  is sound—for all theorem  $A$  in  $KT_m$ ,  $A$  is a valid formula in RMS.

To establish this, we must show that each axiom of  $KT_m$  is valid (i.e., takes only tn or t for all possible assignments of its propositional variables) and that the inference rules preserve validity.

### Axiom 1: Propositional Tautologies

Consider a simple tautology, such as  $p \vee \neg p$ . In all cases, the value is tn, in accordance with implication table. Every tautology can be represented in a conjunctive normal form, each elementary disjunction of which, like  $p \vee \neg p$ , takes only tn. Thus, every propositional tautology would have tn. Therefore, propositional tautologies are valid.

### Axiom 2: Distribution Axiom ( $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$ )

( $\Box$	( $p$	$\rightarrow$	$q$ )	$\rightarrow$	( $\Box p$	$\rightarrow$	$\Box q$ )
t	tn	tn	tn	t	t	t	t
f	tn	tc	tc	t	t	f	f
f	tn	fc	fc	t	t	f	f
f	tn	fn	fn	t	t	f	f

t	tc	tn	tn	t	f	t	t
t/f	tc	t	tc	t	f	t	f
f	tc	fc	fc	t	f	t	f
f	tc	fc	fn	t	f	t	f
t	fc	tn	tn	t	f	t	t
t/f	fc	t	tc	t	f	t	f
t/f	fc	t	fc	t	f	t	f
f	fc	tc	fn	t	f	t	f
t	fn	tn	tn	t	f	t	t
t	fn	tn	tc	t	f	t	f
t	fn	tn	fc	t	f	t	f
t	fn	tn	fn	t	f	t	f

Axiom  $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$  takes t under all assignments, therefore it's valid.

### Axiom 3: Reflexivity Axiom ( $\Box p \rightarrow p$ )

$\Box p$	$\rightarrow$	$p$
t	tn	tn
f	t	tc
f	t	fc
f	t	fn

Reflexivity Axiom takes values tn or t under all assignments, therefore it's valid.

### Inference Rule 1: Modus Ponens

From A and  $A \rightarrow B$ , infer B. Formulas A and  $A \rightarrow B$  are valid (tn or t under all assignments). By construction of the truth table for implication, B also takes tn or t.

### Inference Rule 2: Necessitation Rule

If  $KT_m \vdash A$ , then  $KT_m \vdash \Box A$ . Assume that  $\Box A$  is not a valid formula. Then  $\Box A = f$  under some assignment, therefore  $A$  takes either  $tc$ ,  $fc$  or  $fn$ . This contradicts to the validity of  $A$  ( $tn$  or  $t$ ).

It should be noted that the definition of validity for the formulas requires to have either the determinate value  $tn$ , or indeterminate value  $t$  under all assignments of its variables. If formula  $A$  takes a determinate values  $tc$  or  $fc$  or  $fn$ , or indeterminate value  $f$  under some assignment of its variables, then  $A$  is not valid.

## Completeness Theorem

$KT_m$  is complete—for all valid formula  $A$ ,  $KT_m \vdash A$ —using maximal consistent sets.

**Lemma 1: A consistent set  $\Gamma$  can be extended to a maximal consistent set  $\Gamma$  with:**

For all  $p$  (propositional variables), either  $(p \wedge \Box p) \in \Gamma$ , or  $(p \wedge \neg \Box p) \in \Gamma$ , or  $(\neg p \wedge \neg \Box \neg p) \in \Gamma$ , or  $(\neg p \wedge \Box \neg p) \in \Gamma$ .

If  $\Gamma \vdash B$  and  $\Gamma \subseteq T$ , then  $B \in T$ .

$B \vee C \in T$  if and only if  $B \in T$  or  $C \in T$ .

$B \wedge C \in T$  if and only if  $B \in T$  and  $C \in T$ .

Proof: Use Henkin-style construction, enumerating formulas and adding consistent ones, ensuring maximality and consistency with  $KT_m$  axioms. Properties hold via closure and contradiction avoidance.

**Lemma 2: There exists  $|\cdot|_T$  such that:**

$|A|_T = tn$  if and only if  $A \in T$  and  $\Box A \in T$

$|A|_T = tc$  if and only if  $A \in T$  and  $\neg \Box A \in T$

$|A|_T = fc$  if and only if  $\neg A \in T$  and  $\neg \Box \neg A \in T$

$|A|_T = fn$  if and only if  $\neg A \in T$  and  $\Box \neg A \in T$

## Proof of Lemma 2

**Define the Valuation  $|\cdot|_T$**

The valuation is defined based on membership in  $T$  and the status of  $\Box A$  and its negations:  $|A|_T = tn$  means  $A$  is "necessarily true" in  $T$  (both  $A$  and  $\Box A$  are in  $T$ ) -  $|A|_T = tc$  means  $A$  is "contingently true" ( $A \in T$ , but  $\Box A \notin T$ , so  $\neg \Box A \in T$  by maximality) -  $|A|_T = fc$  means  $A$  is "contingently false" ( $\neg A \in T$ , but  $\Box \neg A \notin T$ , so  $\neg \Box \neg A \in T$ ) -  $|A|_T = fn$  means  $A$  is "necessarily false" ( $\neg A \in T \wedge \Box \neg A \in T$ ). By Lemma 1, for every  $p$ ,  $T$  includes exactly one of:  $(p \wedge \Box p)$ ,  $(p \wedge \neg \Box p)$ ,  $(\neg p \wedge \neg \Box \neg p)$  or  $(\neg p \wedge \Box \neg p)$ . This ensures  $|p|_T$  is uniquely assigned one of  $tn$ ,  $tc$ ,  $fc$ , or  $fn$  for propositional variables, forming a consistent basis.

### Verify Negation ( $\neg$ )

Assume  $|A|_T = tn$ :  $A \in T$ ,  $\Box A \in T$ . Then  $\neg(\neg A) \in T$ ,  $\Box \neg(\neg A) \in T$  (using tautologies and MP). Therefore,  $|\neg A|_T = fn$

Now assume  $|\neg A|_T = fn$ :  $\neg(\neg A) \in T$ ,  $\Box \neg(\neg A) \in T$ . Then  $A \in T$ ,  $\Box A \in T$  (using tautologies and MP).

Therefore,  $|A|_T = tn$

Assume  $|A|_T = tc$ :  $A \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box A \in T$ . Then  $\neg(\neg A) \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box \neg(\neg A) \in T$ . Then  $|\neg A|_T = fc$ .

Now assume  $|\neg A|_T = fc$ ,  $\neg(\neg A) \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box \neg(\neg A) \in T$ . Then  $A \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box A \in T$  (tautologies and MP), so  $|\neg A|_T = tc$ .

Assume  $|A|_T = fc$ :  $\neg A \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box \neg A \in T$ . Then  $|\neg A|_T = tc$ .

In other direction:  $|\neg A|_T = tc$ ,  $\neg A \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box(\neg A) \in T$ . Then  $|A|_T = fc$ .

Assume  $|A|_T = fn$ :  $\neg A \in T$ ,  $\Box \neg A \in T$ . Therefore,  $|\neg A|_T = tn$ .

Now assume  $|\neg A|_T = tn$ :  $\neg A \in T$ ,  $\Box \neg A \in T$ . Then,  $|A|_T = fn$ .

### Verify Implication ( $\rightarrow$ )

Note that the steps of this proof rely solely on tautologies from classical propositional logic and the Distribution Axiom ( $K$ :  $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$ ), which is common to all modal systems considered in this paper ( $K_m$ ,  $KD_m$ ,  $KT_m$ ,  $KT4_m$ , and  $S5_m$ ). This ensures the proof's applicability across these systems, as they all share the  $K$  axiom, allowing for a uniform verification of implication within the RMS framework.

- If  $|A|_T = \text{fn}$ , then  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{tn}$

$|A|_T = \text{fn} \Rightarrow \neg A \in T, \Box \neg A \in T, \neg A \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B) \in T$  (tautology), therefore  $(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ . Further,  $\Box(\neg A \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B)) \in T$  (necessitation),  $\Box(\neg A) \rightarrow \Box(A \rightarrow B) \in T$  (K, MP), therefore, since  $\Box \neg A \in T$ ,  $\Box(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ . So, we get  $(A \rightarrow B) \in T$  and  $\Box(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ , therefore  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{tn}$ .

- If  $|B|_T = \text{tn}$ , then  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{tn}$

$|B|_T = \text{tn} \Rightarrow B \in T, \Box B \in T, B \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B) \in T$  (tautology), therefore  $(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ . Further,  $\Box(B \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B)) \in T$  (necessitation),  $\Box B \rightarrow \Box(A \rightarrow B) \in T$  (K, MP), therefore, since  $\Box B \in T$ ,  $\Box(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ . So, we get  $(A \rightarrow B) \in T$  and  $\Box(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ , therefore  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{tn}$ .

- If  $|A|_T = \text{tn}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fn}$ , then  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{fn}$

$|A|_T = \text{tn} \Rightarrow A \in T, \Box A \in T$ , and  $|B|_T = \text{fn} \Rightarrow \neg B \in T, \Box \neg B \in T$ .

So, we have  $A \in T$  and  $\neg B \in T$ , therefore  $\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ .

We will use the following auxiliary proof (\*):

1. A (premise)
2.  $\Box A$  (premise)
3.  $\neg B$  (premise)
4.  $\Box \neg B$  (premise)
5.  $A \rightarrow (\neg B \rightarrow (A \wedge \neg B))$  (tautology)
6.  $\Box[A \rightarrow (\neg B \rightarrow (A \wedge \neg B))]$  (Nec, 5)
7.  $\Box[A \rightarrow (\neg B \rightarrow (A \wedge \neg B))] \rightarrow (\Box A \rightarrow \Box(\neg B \rightarrow (A \wedge \neg B)))$  (K)
8.  $\Box A \rightarrow \Box(\neg B \rightarrow (A \wedge \neg B))$  (MP, 6, 7)
9.  $\Box(\neg B \rightarrow (A \wedge \neg B))$  (MP, 2, 8)
10.  $\Box(\neg B \rightarrow (A \wedge \neg B)) \rightarrow (\Box \neg B \rightarrow \Box(A \wedge \neg B))$  (K)
11.  $\Box \neg B \rightarrow \Box(A \wedge \neg B)$  (MP, 9, 10)
12.  $\Box(A \wedge \neg B)$  (MP, 4, 11)
13.  $\Box(A \wedge \neg B) \rightarrow \Box \neg(A \rightarrow B)$  (tautology:  $p \wedge \neg q \equiv \neg(p \rightarrow q)$  under  $\Box$ )
14.  $\Box \neg(A \rightarrow B)$  (MP, 12, 13)

Therefore,  $\Box \neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ . Since  $\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ ,  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{fn}$ .

- If  $|A|_T = \text{tn}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fc}$ , then  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{fc}$

$|A|_T = \text{tn} \Rightarrow A \in T, \Box A \in T$ , and  $|B|_T = \text{fc} \Rightarrow \neg B \in T, \neg\Box\neg B \in T$ .

Since  $A \in T$  and  $\neg B \in T$ , then  $\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ . Now assume  $\Box\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ . Then  $\Box(A \wedge \neg B) \in T$ .

We prove auxiliary theorem (\*\*):

1.  $(A \wedge B) \rightarrow A$  (Axiom 1: tautology)
2.  $\Box((A \wedge B) \rightarrow A)$  (Nec, 1)
3.  $\Box((A \wedge B) \rightarrow A) \rightarrow (\Box(A \wedge B) \rightarrow \Box A)$  (Axiom 2: K)
4.  $\Box(A \wedge B) \rightarrow \Box A$  (MP, 2, 3)
5.  $(A \wedge B) \rightarrow B$  (Axiom 1: tautology)
6.  $\Box((A \wedge B) \rightarrow B)$  (Nec, 5)
7.  $\Box((A \wedge B) \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\Box(A \wedge B) \rightarrow \Box B)$  (Axiom 2: K)
8.  $\Box(A \wedge B) \rightarrow \Box B$  (MP, 6, 7)
9.  $((\Box(A \wedge B) \rightarrow \Box A) \wedge (\Box(A \wedge B) \rightarrow \Box B)) \rightarrow (\Box(A \wedge B) \rightarrow (\Box A \wedge \Box B))$  (Axiom 1: tautology)
10.  $(\Box(A \wedge B) \rightarrow \Box A) \wedge (\Box(A \wedge B) \rightarrow \Box B)$  (from 4, 8)
11.  $\Box(A \wedge B) \rightarrow (\Box A \wedge \Box B)$  (MP, 9, 10)

Since we have  $\Box(A \wedge \neg B) \in T$ ,  $(\Box A \wedge \Box\neg B) \in T$ , therefore  $\Box\neg B \in T$ , which contradicts to the assumption.

Therefore,  $\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$  and  $\neg\Box\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ , so  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{fc}$ .

- If  $|A|_T = \text{tc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{tc}$ , then  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{t}$

$A \in T, \neg\Box A \in T$  and  $B \in T, \neg\Box B \in T$ . Assume  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{f}$ , then  $\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ , so  $A \in T, \neg B \in T$ , contradiction. So,  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{t}$ .

- If  $|A|_T = \text{fc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{tc}$ , then  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{t}$

$\neg A \in T, \neg\Box\neg A \in T$  and  $B \in T, \neg\Box B \in T$ . Assume  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{f}$ , then  $\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ , so  $A \in T, \neg B \in T$ , contradiction. So,  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{t}$ .

- If  $|A|_T = \text{fc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fc}$ , then  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{t}$

$\neg A \in T$ ,  $\neg\neg A \in T$  and  $\neg B \in T$ ,  $\neg\neg B \in T$ . Assume  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = f$ , then  $\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ , so  $A \in T$ ,  $\neg B \in T$ , contradiction. So,  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = t$ .

- If  $|A|_T = fc$  and  $|B|_T = fn$ , then  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = tc$

$\neg A \in T$ ,  $\neg\neg A \in T$  and  $\neg B \in T$ ,  $\neg\neg B \in T$ .  $\neg A \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B) \in T$  (tautology), so  $(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ . Assume  $\Box(A \rightarrow B) \in T$

We use the following auxiliary proof:

1.  $\Box\neg B$  premise
2.  $\Box(A \rightarrow B)$
3.  $\Box(\neg B \rightarrow \neg A)$  (2, tautologies, N)
4.  $\Box(\neg B \rightarrow \neg A) \rightarrow (\Box\neg B \rightarrow \Box\neg A)$  (K)
5.  $(\Box\neg B \rightarrow \Box\neg A)$ , (4, MP)
6.  $\Box\neg A$  (1,5,MP)

This contradicts the assumption. Therefore,  $(A \rightarrow B) \in T$  and  $\neg\Box(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ , so  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = tc$ .

- If  $|A|_T = tc$  and  $|B|_T = fn$ , then  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = fc$

$A \in T$ ,  $\neg\Box A \in T$  and  $\neg B \in T$ ,  $\neg\neg B \in T$ , so  $A \wedge \neg B \in T$ , or  $\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ . Now, assume  $\Box(A \wedge \neg B) \in T$ , then  $\Box A \wedge \Box\neg B \in T$  by theorem (\*\*), so  $\Box A \in T$ , contradiction. Therefore,  $\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$  and  $\neg\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ ,  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = fc$ .

- If  $|A|_T = tc$  and  $|B|_T = fc$ , then  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = fc$

$A \in T$ ,  $\neg\Box A \in T$  and  $\neg B \in T$ ,  $\neg\neg B \in T$ , so  $A \wedge \neg B \in T$ , or  $\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ . Now, assume  $\Box(A \wedge \neg B) \in T$ , then  $\Box A \wedge \Box\neg B \in T$  by theorem (\*\*), so  $\Box A \in T$ , contradiction. Therefore,  $\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$  and  $\neg\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ ,  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = fc$ .

**The proof in the opposite direction:**

- If  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = fn$ , then  $|A|_T = tn$  and  $|B|_T = fn$



$\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ , so  $A \in T$ ,  $\neg B \in T$ . Also, we have  $\Box \neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ . Therefore,  $\Box(A \wedge \neg B) \in T$ ,  $\Box A \wedge \Box \neg B \in T$  by theorem (\*\*). So we have  $A \in T$ ,  $\neg B \in T$ ,  $\Box A \in T$ ,  $\Box \neg B \in T$ , therefore,  $|A|_T = \text{tn}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fn}$ .

- If  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{fc}$ , then either  $|A|_T = \text{tn}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fc}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{tc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fc}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{tc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fn}$

Since  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{fc}$ ,  $\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ ,  $A \in T$ ,  $\neg B \in T$ . Also,  $\neg \Box A \vee \Box A \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box \neg B \vee \Box \neg B \in T$ . Therefore,  $(|A|_T = \text{tn} \text{ or } |A|_T = \text{tc})$  and  $(|B|_T = \text{fn} \text{ or } |B|_T = \text{fc})$ . But  $|A|_T = \text{tn}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fn}$  if and only if  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{fn}$ . Therefore,  $|A|_T = \text{tn}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fc}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{tc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fc}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{tc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fn}$ .

- If  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{tn}$ , then either  $|A|_T = \text{fn}$  or  $|B|_T = \text{tn}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{tc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{tc}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{fc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{tc}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{fc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fn}$

Assume  $|A|_T = \text{tn}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{tc}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{fc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fn}$ . Let's  $|A|_T = \text{tn}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{tc}$ , so  $A \in T$ ,  $\Box A \in T$  and  $B \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box B \in T$ . Since  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{tn}$ ,  $\Box(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ ,  $(\Box A \rightarrow \Box B) \in T$  (Distribution axiom),  $\Box B \in T$  ( $\Box A \in T$ , MP). This contradicts to the assumption.

Now assume  $|A|_T = \text{fc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fn}$ , so  $\neg A \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box \neg A \in T$  and  $\neg B \in T$ ,  $\Box \neg B \in T$ . Since  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{tn}$ ,  $(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ ,  $\Box(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ ,  $(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\neg B \rightarrow \neg A) \in T$ ,  $\Box((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\neg B \rightarrow \neg A)) \in T$ ,  $\Box(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow \Box(\neg B \rightarrow \neg A) \in T$ ,  $\Box(\neg B \rightarrow \neg A) \in T$ ,  $\Box \neg B \rightarrow \Box \neg A \in T$ ,  $\Box \neg A \in T$ , contradiction.

Therefore,  $|A|_T = \text{fn}$  or  $|B|_T = \text{tn}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{tc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{tc}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{fc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{tc}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{fc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fn}$ .

- If  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{tc}$ , then either  $|A|_T = \text{tn}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{tc}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{tc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{tc}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{fc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{tc}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{fc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fn}$

Assume  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{tc}$  but  $|A|_T = \text{fn}$  or  $|B|_T = \text{tn}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{tc}$  (tn or tc) and  $|B|_T = \text{f}$  (fn or fc).

If  $|A|_T = \text{fn}$  or  $|B|_T = \text{tn}$ , then  $|A \rightarrow B|_T = \text{tn}$  (proved before). If  $|A|_T = \text{t}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{f}$ , then  $\neg(A \rightarrow B) \in T$ , contradiction.

Therefore,  $|A|_T = \text{tn}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{tc}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{tc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{tc}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{fc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{tc}$  or  $|A|_T = \text{fc}$  and  $|B|_T = \text{fn}$ .

**A=B:**

For  $A = B$ , for any of the truth values  $tn$ ,  $tc$ ,  $fc$  and  $fn$ ,  $(A \rightarrow A) \in T$ , by Nec rule,  $\Box(A \rightarrow A) \in T$ , so we get  $|A \rightarrow A|_T = tn$ .

In the other direction:

Since  $|A \rightarrow A|_T = tn$ , then  $(A \rightarrow A) \in T$ ,

$((A \rightarrow A) \rightarrow ((A \wedge \Box A) \vee (A \neg \Box A) \vee (\neg A \wedge \neg \Box \neg A) \vee (\neg A \wedge \Box \neg A))) \in T$ .

By applying MP, we get  $(A \wedge \Box A) \vee (A \neg \Box A) \vee (\neg A \wedge \neg \Box \neg A) \vee (\neg A \wedge \Box \neg A)$ , so  $|A|_T = tn$  or  $|A|_T = tc$  and  $|A|_T = fc$  or  $|A|_T = fn$ .

The verification of the negation and of the implication definitions for the indeterminate truth values  $t$  and  $f$  is straightforward.

### Verify Modal Operator ( $\Box$ )

KTm:  $|\Box A|_T$ :  $\Box tn = t$ ,  $\Box tc = f$ ,  $\Box fc = f$ ,  $\Box fn = f$ .  $|A|_T = tn$ :  $A \in T$ ,  $\Box A \in T$ ,  $|\Box A|_T = t$ .  $|A|_T = tc$ :  $A \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box A \in T$ ,  $|\Box A|_T = f$ .  $|A|_T = fc$ :  $\neg A \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box \neg A \in T$ ,  $\neg A \rightarrow \neg \Box \neg A \in T$  (contraposition to T),  $\neg \Box A \in T$ ,  $|\Box A|_T = f$ .  $|A|_T = fn$ :  $\neg A \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box A \in T$ ,  $\neg A \rightarrow \neg \Box A \in T$  (contraposition to T),  $\neg \Box A \in T$ ,  $|\Box A|_T = f$ .

### Axioms in $|\cdot|_T$

As the interpretation  $|\cdot|_T$  preserves the table definitions for all logical connectives and the modal operator, every axiom of the KTm system is a valid formula, and the inference rules maintain this validity.

### Conclusion

$|\cdot|_T$  matches KTm semantics ( $\neg$ ,  $\rightarrow$ ,  $\Box$ ). All axioms hold in T, and validity ( $tn$  or  $t$ ) is preserved.

Assume that formula E is valid but not provable in KTm. Consequently,  $\neg \neg E$  is also not provable in KTm. Thus, the set  $\{\neg E\}$  is consistent with KTm and, by Lemma 1, can be extended to a maximal consistent set T. According to Lemma 2, all formulas in T take the values  $tn$  or  $tc$  in the given interpretation. Therefore,  $\neg E$  also takes the values  $tn$  or  $tc$  in this interpretation. This implies that formula E takes the values  $fc$  or  $fn$ .

in the same interpretation, which contradicts the assumption that E is valid (since validity requires E to take only the values tn or t). Hence, the completeness theorem is proved.

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## 4.4 System KT4m: Reflexive and Transitive Logic

KT4m aligns with Kripke's S4 (reflexive and transitive accessibility).

In Kripke semantics, KT4 (akin to S4) has a reflexive and transitive accessibility relation. Reflexivity ensures  $\Box p$  implies  $p$  in the actual world, and transitivity (if  $w$  accesses  $v$  and  $v$  accesses  $u$ , then  $w$  accesses  $u$ ) strengthens necessity. In the sequence model,  $tn = \langle t, t, t, \dots \rangle$  fully satisfies transitivity, so  $\Box tn = tn$  as necessity propagates indefinitely. For  $tc = \langle t, f, f, \dots \rangle$ ,  $\Box tc = f$  ( $fc$  or  $fn$ ) since truth doesn't persist transitively. For  $fc = \langle f, t, t, \dots \rangle$  and  $fn = \langle f, f, f, \dots \rangle$ ,  $\Box fc = f$  and  $\Box fn = f$  because neither ensures truth in  $w_0$  (reflexivity) nor across all transitively reachable worlds, restricting necessity to  $tn$  alone.

- **Modal Operator ( $\Box$ ):**

p	$\Box p$
tn	tn
tc	f
fc	f
fn	f

- **Axioms:**

1. Propositional Tautologies
2. K:  $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$
3. T:  $\Box p \rightarrow p$
4. 4:  $\Box p \rightarrow \Box \Box p$

- **Rules:** Modus Ponens, Necessitation.

**Soundness Theorem:** All theorems of KT4m are valid.

*Proof:*

- **Axiom 1:** Tautologies valid (see KTm).

- **Axiom 2:**  $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$

$(\Box$	$(p$	$\rightarrow$	$q)$	$\rightarrow$	$(\Box p$	$\rightarrow$	$\Box q))$
tn	tn	tn	tn	tn	tn	tn	tn
f	tn	tc	tc	t	tn	f	f
f	tn	fc	fc	t	tn	f	f
f	tn	fn	fn	t	tn	f	f
tn	tc	tn	tn	tn	f	tn	tn
t/f	tc	t	tc	t	f	t	f
f	tc	fc	fc	t	f	t	f
f	tc	fc	fn	t	f	t	f
tn	fc	tn	tn	tn	f	tn	tn
t/f	fc	t	tc	t	f	t	f
t/f	fc	t	fc	t	f	t	f
t	fc	tc	fn	t	f	t	f
t	fn	tn	tn	tn	f	t	tn
tn	fn	tn	tc	t	f	t	f
tn	fn	tn	fc	t	f	t	f
tn	fn	tn	fn	t	f	t	f

- **Axiom 3:**  $\Box p \rightarrow p$

$(\Box p$	$\rightarrow$	$p)$
tn	tn	tn
f	t	tc
f	t	fc
f	t	fn

- **Axiom 4:**  $\Box p \rightarrow \Box \Box p$

$\Box$	$p$	$\rightarrow$	$\Box$	$\Box$	$p$
tn	tn	tn	tn	tn	tn

f	tc	t	f	f	tc
f	fc	t	f	f	fc
f	fn	t	f	f	fn

Axiom 4 takes  $t_n$  or  $t$ , therefore it's valid

**Rules:** Same as  $KT_m$ .

**Completeness Theorem:** Every valid formula in RMS for  $KT4_m$  is provable.

- Proof for **Lemma 1** and **Lemma 2**: Similar as for  $KT_m$ .
- **Conclusion:** System  $KT4_m$  is complete.

## 4.5 System $S5_m$ : Reflexive, Transitive, and Symmetric Logic

$S5_m$  matches Kripke's  $S5$  (full accessibility).

In Kripke semantics,  $S5$  is characterized by a reflexive, transitive, and symmetric (equivalence) relation, ensuring all worlds are mutually accessible. Thus,  $\Box p$  is true at a world if and only if  $p$  is true in all worlds, with no room for contingency under this universal accessibility. In the RMS sequence model, where truth values are represented as sequences over worlds with  $w_0$  as the actual world, if  $p = t_n = \langle t, t, \dots \rangle$ , then by transitivity,  $\Box p = t_n$ , as  $p$ 's truth persists across all accessible worlds, securing absolute necessity. However, if  $p \neq t_n$ —taking values  $t_c = \langle t, f, f, \dots \rangle$ ,  $f_c = \langle f, t, t, \dots \rangle$ , or  $f_n = \langle f, f, f, \dots \rangle$ —then  $\Box p$  cannot be true (i.e., neither  $t_n$  nor  $t_c$ ), since  $p$  fails to hold universally; by Axiom 5 ( $\Diamond p \rightarrow \Box \Diamond p$ , or equivalently  $\neg \Box \neg p \rightarrow \Box \neg \Box \neg p$ ), it follows that  $\neg \Box p$  must be necessary ( $\neg \Box p \rightarrow \Box \neg \Box p$ ), implying  $\Box p = f_n$ , as necessary falsity is the only consistent value in  $S5_m$  for such cases. Thus, for  $p = t_c, f_c$ , or  $f_n$ ,  $\Box p = f_n$ , reflecting that any deviation from necessary truth collapses to necessary falsity under  $S5$ 's equivalence structure.

- **Modal Operator ( $\Box$ ):**

$p$	$\Box p$
$t_n$	$t_n$
$t_c$	$f_n$

fc	fn
fn	fn

- **Axioms:**

1. Propositional Tautologies
2. K:  $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$
3. T:  $\Box p \rightarrow p$
4. 4:  $\Box p \rightarrow \Box \Box p$
5. 5:  $\Diamond p \rightarrow \Box \Diamond p$

- **Rules:** Modus Ponens, Necessitation.

**Soundness Theorem:** All theorems of S5m are valid.

*Proof:*

- **Axiom 1:** Tautologies valid (see KTm).
- **Axiom 2:** Proof similar to previous systems. Valid.
- **Axiom 3:**  $\Box p \rightarrow p$  Proof similar to previous systems. Valid.
- **Axiom 4:**  $\Box p \rightarrow \Box \Box p$  Proof similar to previous systems. Valid.
- **Axiom 5:**  $\Diamond p \rightarrow \Box \Diamond p$

$\neg$	$\Box$	$\neg$	p	$\rightarrow$	$\Box$	$\neg$	$\Box$	$\neg$	p
tn	fn	fn	tn	tn	tn	tn	fn	fn	tn
tn	fn	fc	tc	tn	tn	tn	fn	fc	tc
tn	fn	tc	fc	tn	tn	tn	fn	tc	fc
fn	tn	tn	fn	tn	fn	fn	tn	tn	fn

Axiom 5 takes only values tn, therefore, it's a valid formula.

- **Rules:** Same as KTm.

**Completeness Theorem:** Every valid formula in RMS for S5m is provable.

Proof for **Lemma 1** and **Lemma 2:** the same as for KTm.

- **Conclusion:** Same as KTm.

## 4.6 RMS Semantics for Non-Reflexive Modal Logics

Before delving into the specifics of the KDm system, it's worth considering how Resolution Matrix Semantics (RMS) can be applied in the opposite direction from our previous explorations—toward modal systems weaker than KTm, where the Kripkean framework lacks reflexivity. In reflexive systems like KTm, the accessibility relation ensures that every world accesses itself, constraining the behavior of the modal operator  $\Box$  and its truth values.

Our intuition suggests that relaxing this condition—moving to systems without reflexivity—should result in even broader, less determinate truth values for  $\Box$ , reflecting greater semantic flexibility due to fewer structural restrictions. KDm, corresponding to Kripke's KD system with seriality but no reflexivity, serves as a confirmation of this intuition.

Here, we apply RMS semantics to analyze a non-reflexive logic, observing how the definition of the modal operator adapts to this weaker framework. KDm's modal operator allows a broader range of indeterminate values than KTm. One case subtly restricts the implication matrix to align precisely with the system's properties. For instance, when  $p = fc$  and  $q = tc$ ,  $p \rightarrow q$  yields  $tc$  instead of  $t$  ( $tn$  or  $tc$ ). Similarly, when  $p = q = tc$  or  $p = q = fc$ ,  $p \rightarrow q$  results in  $tn$  rather than  $t$  ( $tn$  or  $tc$ ).

### 4.6.1 System KDm:

System KDm corresponds to Kripke's KD system, featuring a serial accessibility relation (for every world  $w$ , there exists some  $v$  such that  $wRv$ ). In RMS, KDm uses the same language and foundational semantics as KTm, with adjusted axioms and modal operator definitions.

In the development of RMS semantics, system KDm stands out as the first system in this paper to incorporate the indeterminate truth value " $t/f$ ," which can resolve to any of the four values:  $tn$ ,  $tc$ ,  $fc$ , or  $fn$  (or their combinations). This indeterminacy arises specifically when  $p$  takes the value  $fc$  (contingent false), where there exists a possibility that  $\Box p$  is true—meaning  $p$  could be false in the actual world ( $w_0$ ) but true in all accessible worlds in the sequence, such as  $\langle f, t, t, \dots \rangle$ .

Suppose  $p = fc = \langle f, t, t, t, \dots \rangle$ , meaning  $p$  is false in the actual world ( $w_0$ ) but true in all accessible worlds ( $w_1, w_2, \dots$ ), and  $q = tc = \langle t, f, f, f, \dots \rangle$ , meaning  $q$  is true in  $w_0$  but false in all or at least some accessible worlds. In Kripkean terms,  $fc \rightarrow tc$  would evaluate  $p \rightarrow q$  across worlds: at  $w_0$ ,  $\langle f \rightarrow t \rangle = t$ , but

in accessible worlds, for some number  $i$ , (e.g.,  $w_i$ ),  $\langle t \rightarrow f \rangle = f$ , since  $t$  at  $w_i$  (for  $p$ ) implies  $f$  at  $w_i$  (for  $q$ ), yielding falsehood. Thus, in RMS for KDm,  $fc \rightarrow tc = tc$  in this case, reflecting contingency rather than necessity, which we refine in the implication matrix below to maintain consistency with KD's weaker structure.

Since KDm corresponds to Kripke's KD system with a serial but non-reflexive accessibility relation, the lack of reflexivity allows  $p$  to be false in the actual world while still permitting  $\Box p$  to hold if all subsequent worlds are true, rendering  $\Box p$ 's truth value indeterminate in the general case and thus spanning the range  $\{t, f\}$ . This marks a significant departure from the more constrained modal operator definitions in reflexive systems like KTm, highlighting KDm's greater semantic flexibility.

#### 4.6.2 RMS Semantics for KDm

**Implication ( $\rightarrow$ ):**

$p \rightarrow q$	tn	tc	fc	fn
tn	tn	tc	fc	fn
tc	tn	t/tn*	fc	fc
fc	tn	t/tc*	t/tn*	tc
fn	tn	tn	tn	tn

\*) if  $p = fc$ , then  $\Box p = t$

The definitions for negation and implication involving indeterminate and mixed (determinate and indeterminate) truth values can be derived from the implication table for determinate values provided above. Simply apply all corresponding columns for an indeterminate truth value (e.g., tn and tc for t).

$p$	$\neg p$
t	f
f	t
t/f	f/t



$p \rightarrow q$	t/f	t	f
t/f*	t	t	f/t
t	t/f	t	f
f	t	t	t

\*) The implication  $u1/v1 \rightarrow u2/v2$  results in  $(u1 \rightarrow v1)/(u2 \rightarrow v2)$ . This follows from the need for consistency: for instance, if  $p = fc$  and  $\Box p = t/f$ , then each subcase (t or f) must be evaluated uniformly using the same assignment of propositions.

- **Modal Operator ( $\Box$ ):**

p	$\Box p$
tn	t
tc	f
fc	f/t
fn	f

### Axioms and Rules

- **Axioms:**
  1. Propositional Tautologies.
  2. Distribution Axiom (K):  $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$ .
  3. Seriality Axiom (D):  $\Box p \rightarrow \neg \Box \neg p$ .
- **Inference Rules:**
  - Modus Ponens (MP): From p and  $p \rightarrow q$ , infer q.
  - Necessitation (Nec): From p, infer  $\Box p$  (if  $KDm \vdash p$ ).

### Soundness Theorem

**Theorem:**  $KDm$  is sound—for every theorem A in  $KDm$ , A is valid in RMS.

**Proof:** We must show that all axioms are valid and the inference rules preserve validity.

- **Axiom 1: Propositional Tautologies**

All propositional axioms take tn. The proof is the same as in previous systems.

Axiom 1 is a valid formula.

- **Axiom 2: Distribution Axiom ( $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$ )**

( $\Box$	(p	$\rightarrow$	q)	$\rightarrow$	( $\Box p$	$\rightarrow$	$\Box q$ ))
t	tn	tn	tn	t	t	t	t
f	tn	tc	tc	t	t	f	f
t/f	tn	fc	fc	t	t	t/f	t/f
f	tn	fn	fn	t	t	f	f
t	tc	tn	tn	t	f	t	t
t/f	tc	t	tc	t	f	t	f
t/f	tc	fc	fc	t	f	t	t/f
t/f	tc	fc	fn	t	f	t	f
t	fc	tn	tn	t	f	t	t
t/f	fc	t	tc	t	f	t	f
t/f	fc	t	fc	t	f	t	f
f	fc	tc	fn	t	f	t	f
t	fn	tn	tn	t	f	t	t
t	fn	tn	tc	t	f	t	f
t	fn	tn	fc	t	f	t	f
t	fn	tn	fn	t	f	t	f

Axiom 2 takes only values t; therefore, it's a valid formula.

- **Axiom 3: Seriality Axiom ( $\Box p \rightarrow \neg \Box \neg p$ )**

$\Box$	p	$\rightarrow$	$\neg$	$\Box$	$\neg$	p
t	tn	t	t	f	fn	tn
f	tc	t	t/f	f/t	fc	tc
t/f	fc	t	t	f	tc	fc
f	fn	t	f	t	tn	fn

Axiom 3 is a valid formula.

- **Inference Rule 1: Modus Ponens**

Same as in previous systems.

- **Inference Rule 2: Necessitation**

Same as in previous systems.

**Conclusion:** All axioms and rules hold; KDm is sound.

### Completeness Theorem

**Theorem:** KDm is complete—for every valid formula A in RMS,  $\text{KDm} \vdash A$ .

**Proof:** We use maximal consistent sets, adapting the KTm approach.

- **Lemma 1:** A consistent set  $\Gamma$  can be extended to a maximal consistent set T with:
  - For all p, exactly one of  $(p \wedge \Box p)$ ,  $(p \wedge \neg \Box p)$ ,  $(\neg p \wedge \neg \Box \neg p \wedge \neg \Box p)$ ,  $(\neg p \wedge \neg \Box \neg p \wedge \Box p)$  or  $(\neg p \wedge \Box \neg p) \in T$ .
  - If  $\Gamma \vdash B$  and  $\Gamma \subseteq T$ , then  $B \in T$ .
  - $B \vee C \in T$  iff  $B \in T$  or  $C \in T$ .
  - $B \wedge C \in T$  iff  $B \in T$  and  $C \in T$ .

**Proof:** Enumerate formulas, add each if consistent with KDm axioms (K, D), ensuring maximality via closure and contradiction avoidance (as in KTm).

- **Lemma 2:** There exists a valuation  $|\cdot|_T$  such that:
  - $|A|_T = \text{tn}$  iff  $A \in T$  and  $\Box A \in T$ .
  - $|A|_T = \text{tc}$  iff  $A \in T$  and  $\neg \Box A \in T$ .
  - $|A|_T = \text{fc}$  iff  $\neg A \in T$  and  $\neg \Box \neg A \in T$  and  $\neg \Box A \in T$  in case  $\Box \text{fc} = \text{f}$ ;
  - $|A|_T = \text{fc}$  iff  $\neg A \in T$  and  $\neg \Box \neg A \in T$  and  $\Box A \in T$  in case  $\Box \text{fc} = \text{t}$ .
  - $|A|_T = \text{fn}$  iff  $\neg A \in T$  and  $\Box \neg A \in T$ .

**Proof of Lemma 2:**

- **Define the Valuation  $|\cdot|_T$ :**

By Lemma 1,  $T$  assigns each  $p$  exactly one of:

- $p \wedge \Box p$  (tn: true and necessary).
- $p \wedge \neg \Box p$  (tc: true but not necessary).
- $\neg p \wedge \neg \Box \neg p \wedge \neg \Box p$  (fc: false but not necessarily false and not necessarily true).
- $\neg p \wedge \neg \Box \neg p \wedge \Box p$  (fc: false and necessarily true and therefore not necessarily false).
- $\neg p \wedge \Box \neg p$  (fn: false and necessarily false).

This ensures  $|p|_T \in \{tn, tc, fc_1, fc_2, fn\}$  uniquely for propositional variables.

- **Verify Negation ( $\neg$ ):**

- $|A|_T = tn$ :  $A \in T$ ,  $\Box A \in T$ .  $\neg \neg A \in T$ ,  $\Box \neg \neg A \in T$  (tautologies, MP), so  $|\neg A|_T = fn$ .
- $|\neg A|_T = fn$ :  $\neg A \in T$ ,  $\Box \neg A \in T$ .  $\neg \neg A \in T$ ,  $\Box A \in T$ , so  $|A|_T = tn$ .
- $|A|_T = tc$ :  $A \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box A \in T$ .  $\neg \neg A \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box \neg(\neg A) \in T$ , so  $(\neg(\neg A)) \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box \neg(\neg A) \in T$  and  $\neg \Box(\neg A) \in T$  or  $(\neg(\neg A)) \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box \neg(\neg A) \in T$  and  $\Box(\neg A) \in T$  so  $|\neg A|_T = fc$ .
- $|\neg A|_T = fc$ :  $(\neg(\neg A)) \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box \neg(\neg A) \in T$  and  $\neg \Box(\neg A) \in T$  or  $(\neg(\neg A)) \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box \neg(\neg A) \in T$  and  $\Box(\neg A) \in T$ , therefore  $(\neg A) \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box(\neg A) \in T$ , so  $|\neg A|_T = tc$ .
- $|A|_T = fn$ :  $\neg A \in T$ ,  $\Box \neg A \in T$ .  $|\neg A|_T = tn$ .
- $|\neg A|_T = tn$ :  $(\neg A) \in T$ ,  $\Box(\neg A) \in T$ ,  $|A|_T = fn$ .

- **Verify Implication ( $\rightarrow$ ):**

- The proof is similar to the same proof in the system  $KT_m$ .
- Let's show the case: if  $p = fc$ ,  $q = tc$ , then  $p \rightarrow q = t/tc$ .
- **1<sup>st</sup> case (for  $p = fc$ ,  $\Box p = f$ ):**
- Let's prove that if  $p = fc$ ,  $q = tc$ , then  $p \rightarrow q = t$
- We have  $\neg p \in T$  and  $\neg \Box \neg p \in T$  and  $\neg \Box p \in T$ ,  $q \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box q \in T$ . Assume  $p \rightarrow q = f$ , then  $p \in T$  and  $\neg q \in T$ , contradiction
- **2<sup>nd</sup> case (for  $p = fc$ ,  $\Box p = t$ ):**
- We prove that if  $p = fc$ ,  $q = tc$ , then  $p \rightarrow q = tc$
- We have  $\neg p \in T$  and  $\neg \Box \neg p \in T$  and  $\Box p \in T$ ,  $q \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box q \in T$ . Assume  $p \rightarrow q = f$ , then  $p \in T$  and  $\neg q \in T$ , contradiction. Now assume  $p \rightarrow q = tn$ , therefore  $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \in T$ ,  $(\Box p \rightarrow \Box q) \in T$  (by axiom K), and since  $\Box p \in T$ , we get  $\Box q \in T$ , contradiction.

- **Verify Modal Operator ( $\Box$ ):**

- $|A|_T = tn$ :  $A \in T$ ,  $\Box A \in T$ ,  $|\Box A|_T = t$ .
- $|A|_T = tc$ :  $A \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box A \in T$ ,  $|\Box A|_T = f$ .
- $|A|_T = fc$ :  $\neg A \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box \neg A \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box A \in T$ ,  $|\Box A|_T = f$  – 1st case (for  $p = fc$ ,  $\Box p = f$ )
- $|A|_T = fc$ :  $\neg A \in T$ ,  $\neg \Box \neg A \in T$ ,  $\Box A \in T$ ,  $|\Box A|_T = t$  – 2nd case (for  $p = fc$ ,  $\Box p = t$ )

- $|A|_T = \text{fn}: \neg A \in T, \Box \neg A \in T, \Box \neg A \rightarrow \neg \Box A \in T \text{ (D)}, \neg \Box A \in T, |\Box A|_T = \text{f}.$
- The verification of the negation and of the implication definitions for the indeterminate truth values t and f and t/f is straightforward.
- **Axioms in  $|\cdot|_T$ :**
  - Tautologies, K, D hold (as in soundness).
  - $|\cdot|_T$  matches KDm semantics.

**Conclusion:** If A is valid but not provable,  $\neg A$  is consistent, extends to T,  $\neg A$  valid formula, then A is not a valid formula, contradicting the assumption. KDm is complete.

### 4.6.3 System Km (Minimal Logic)

System Km corresponds to Kripke's minimal modal system K, which imposes no constraints on the accessibility relation—no requirements such as seriality, reflexivity, transitivity, or symmetry apply. In Resolution Matrix Semantics (RMS), Km adopts the same language and foundational semantics as other systems (e.g., KTm, KDm), but its lack of relational restrictions results in a highly flexible modal operator definition. Unlike KDm, which introduces seriality and constrains  $\Box \text{fn}$  to f, Km permits  $\Box \text{fn}$  to take t/f - fully indeterminate values in certain cases, reflecting the absence of structural assumptions about accessible worlds.

In the context of a single, non-reflexive world with no accessible worlds within System Km, any proposition p's truth value is determinate solely by its value at  $w_0$ . If p is false at  $w_0$ , its truth value is fn (necessary false). However, the necessity operator  $\Box p$  is true at  $w_0$  because p is considered true in all accessible worlds—vacuously true since there are none. Thus, the truth value of  $\Box p$  is tn (necessary truth). This scenario illustrates that in System Km, for p with truth value fn,  $\Box p$  can take the value t (either tn or tc), specifically tn in this case, aligning with the system's definition where  $\Box p = \text{t/f}$  for  $p = \text{fn}$ . This highlights the indeterminacy inherent in System Km, where the absence of constraints on the accessibility relation allows for such cases, and notably, both  $\Box p$  and  $\Box \neg p$  can be tn, reflecting the vacuous truth of necessity in isolated worlds.

### RMS Semantics for Km

Km employs the same language as KDm.

## Negation ( $\neg$ )

The Negation matrix definition is the same as in KDm.

## Implication ( $\rightarrow$ )

$p \rightarrow q^*$	tn	tc	fc	fn
tn	tn	tc	fc	fn
tc	tn	t/tn	fc	fc
fc	tn	t/tc	t/tn	tc
fn	tn	tn	tn	tn

\*) 1<sup>st</sup> case: for  $p = fn$ ,  $\Box p = f$

$p \rightarrow q^{**}$	tn	fn
tn	tn	tn
fn	tn	tn

\*\*) 2<sup>nd</sup> case: for  $p = fn$ ,  $\Box p = t$ ; no tc or fc

The negation and implication definitions for indeterminate truth values t, f and t/f are defined the same way as for system KDm. The implication  $u1/v1 \rightarrow u2/v2$  results in  $(u1 \rightarrow v1)/(u2 \rightarrow v2)$ . This follows from the need for consistency: for instance, if  $p = fc$ , then  $\Box p = t/f$ , and each subcase (t or f) must be evaluated uniformly using the same assignment of propositions.

## Modal Operator ( $\Box$ )

In Kripke's K,  $\Box p$  is true at  $w_0$  if  $p$  is true in all worlds accessible from  $w_0$ , but with no constraints on R,  $\Box p$ 's value depends entirely on the interpretation. In RMS:

p	$\Box p$
tn	t
tc	f
fc	f/t*
fn	f/t**

\*) for  $p = fc$ ,  $\Box p = f$ , this value is f; for  $p = fc$ ,  $\Box p = t$ , this value is t.

\*\*) for  $p = fn$ ,  $\Box p = f$ , this value is f; for  $p = fn$ ,  $\Box p = t$ , this value is t.

For the modal operator definition, if  $p = \text{fn}$  and  $\Box p = \text{t}$ , in fact, there are no contingent truth values, as it was mentioned before. So, for this case, the definition for modal operator is as follows:

p	$\Box p$
tn	t
fn	t

## Axioms and Rules

### Axioms:

1. Propositional Tautologies.
2. Distribution Axiom (K):  $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$ .

### Inference Rules:

1. Modus Ponens (MP)
2. Necessitation (Nec)

Km omits additional axioms like D, T, 4, or 5, making it the baseline modal system.

## Soundness Theorem

**Theorem:** Km is sound—for every theorem A in Km, A is valid in RMS.

**Proof:** Show that all axioms are valid and inference rules preserve validity.

### Axiom 1: Propositional Tautologies

The same way as in previous cases; tautologies take only tn.

### Axiom 2: Distribution Axiom ( $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$ )

$(\Box$	<b>(p</b>	$\rightarrow$	<b>q)</b>	$\rightarrow$	<b>(<math>\Box p</math></b>	$\rightarrow$	<b><math>\Box q)</math></b>
t	tn	tn	tn	t	t	t	t
f	tn	tc	tc	t	t	f	f
t/f	tn	fc	fc	t	t	t/f	t/f
t/f	tn	fn	fn	t	t	t/f	t/f
t	tc	tn	tn	t	f	t	t
t/f	tc	t	tc	t	f	t	f

t/f	tc	fc	fc	t	f	t	t/f
t/f	tc	fc	fn	t	f	t	t/f
t	fc	tn	tn	t	f	t	t
t/f	fc	t	tc	t	f	t	f
t/f	fc	t	fc	t	f	t	f
f	fc	tc	fn	t	f	t	f
t	fn	tn	tn	t	f	t	t
t	fn	tn	tc	t	f	t	f
t	fn	tn	fc	t	f	t	f
t	fn	tn	fn	t	f	t	t/f

Axiom 2 is valid.

The proof for inference rules is the same as in previous systems.

**Conclusion:** All axioms and rules hold;  $K_m$  is sound.

### Completeness Theorem

**Theorem:**  $K_m$  is complete—for every valid formula  $A$  in RMS,  $K_m \vdash A$ .

**Proof:** Use maximal consistent sets, adapting the  $KD_m$  approach.

#### Lemma 1

A consistent set  $\Gamma$  can be extended to a maximal consistent set  $T$  with:

- For all  $p$ , exactly one of  $(p \wedge \Box p)$ ,  $(p \wedge \neg \Box p)$ ,  $(\neg p \wedge \neg \Box \neg p \wedge \neg \Box p)$ ,  $(\neg p \wedge \neg \Box \neg p \wedge \Box p)$  or  $(\neg p \wedge \Box \neg p \wedge \neg \Box p)$  or  $(\neg p \wedge \Box \neg p \wedge \Box p) \in T$ .
- If  $\Gamma \vdash B$  and  $\Gamma \subseteq T$ , then  $B \in T$ .
- $B \vee C \in T$  iff  $B \in T$  or  $C \in T$ .
- $B \wedge C \in T$  iff  $B \in T$  and  $C \in T$ .

**Proof:** Enumerate formulas, add each if consistent with  $K_m$  axioms ( $K$ ), ensuring maximality via closure and contradiction avoidance (as in  $KD_m$ ).

#### Lemma 2

There exists a valuation  $|\cdot|_T$  such that:



- $|A|_T = \text{tn}$  iff  $A \in T$  and  $\Box A \in T$ .
- $|A|_T = \text{tc}$  iff  $A \in T$  and  $\neg\Box A \in T$ .
- $|A|_T = \text{fc}$  iff  $\neg A \in T$  and  $\neg\Box\neg A \in T$  and  $\neg\Box A \in T$  in case  $\Box\text{fc}=\text{f}$ ;
- $|A|_T = \text{fc}$  iff  $\neg A \in T$  and  $\neg\Box\neg A \in T$  and  $\Box A \in T$  in case  $\Box\text{fc}=\text{t}$ .
- $|A|_T = \text{fn}$  iff  $\neg A \in T$  and  $\Box\neg A \in T$  and  $\neg\Box A \in T$  in case  $\Box\text{fn}=\text{f}$ ;
- $|A|_T = \text{fn}$  iff  $\neg A \in T$  and  $\Box\neg A \in T$  and  $\Box A \in T$  in case  $\Box\text{fn}=\text{t}$ .

### Proof of Lemma 2:

- **Define the Valuation  $|\cdot|_T$ :**
  - $p \wedge \Box p$  (tn: true and necessary).
  - $p \wedge \neg\Box p$  (tc: true but not necessary).
  - $\neg p \wedge \neg\Box\neg p \wedge \neg\Box p$  (fc: false but not necessarily false and not necessarily true, sub interpretation).
  - $\neg p \wedge \neg\Box\neg p \wedge \Box p$  (fc: false but not necessarily false and necessarily true, sub interpretation).
  - $\neg p \wedge \Box\neg p \wedge \neg\Box p$  (fn: false and necessarily false and not necessarily true, sub interpretation).
  - $\neg p \wedge \Box\neg p \wedge \Box p$  (fn: false and necessarily false and necessarily true, sub interpretation).
- **Verify Negation ( $\neg$ ):** Proof similar to KDm.
- **Verify Implication ( $\rightarrow$ ):** Similar to KDm, adjusted for Km's implication table
- **Verify Modal Operator ( $\Box$ ):** Similar to KDm, adjusted for Km's modal operator table

$|\cdot|_T$  matches Km semantics.

**Conclusion:** Same as in previous systems. Km is complete.

## 5. Tableau Method for Resolution Matrix Semantics

The tableau method, a classical tool in propositional logic for testing validity, systematically decomposes formulas into their subformulas to determine if a contradiction arises under all possible truth assignments [2, 10]. In Resolution Matrix Semantics (RMS), we adapt this approach to modal contexts by leveraging the finite set of truth values—necessary truth (tn), contingent truth (tc), contingent false (fc), and necessary false (fn)—alongside indeterminate values (t, f, t/f). A formula  $A$  is valid in an RMS system if its negation  $\neg A$  cannot be assigned a "true" value (tn or t) in any interpretation, meaning every branch of

the tableau closes (i.e., contains a contradiction). This section outlines the tableau method for RMS and provides examples for the system KTm, illustrating cases where a formula is a theorem (valid) and where it is not.

### Tableau Rules in RMS

The following is the complete set of tableau rules for the KTm system. Each application of the tableau rules begins with the **FA** rule, followed by the application of all relevant rules to decompose the initial formula, continuing until either all branches close or at least one branch remains open.

The justification for this approach is as follows: valid formulas under each assignment of their propositions take a determinate truth value (tn) or an indeterminate truth value (t). If a formula is not valid, it takes the value  $(tc \vee fc \vee fn) \wedge f$ , resulting in  $f$  (this result follows from applying table definitions for the connectives). Starting from the **FA** rule, we split the proof tree into **FnA** and **FcA** branches, which are decomposed until these branches either close or at least one remains open.

### Tableau Rules – KTm:

TA

TA	
TnA	TcA

FA

FA	
FnA	FcA

Tn¬

Tn(¬A)	
FnA	

Tc¬

Tc(¬A)	
FcA	

Fc¬

Fc(¬A)	
TcA	

Fn¬

Fn(¬A)	
TnA	

Tn→

$Tn(A \rightarrow B)$				
$FnA$	$TnB$	$TcA, TcB$	$FcA, TcB$	$FcA, FcB$

$Tc \rightarrow$

$Tc(A \rightarrow B)$				
$TnA, TcB$	$TcA, TcB$	$FcA, TcB$	$FcA, FcB$	$FcA, FnB$

$Fc \rightarrow$

$Fc(A \rightarrow B)$		
$TnA, FcB$	$TcA, FcB$	$TcA, FnB$

$Fn \rightarrow$

$Fn(A \rightarrow B)$
$TnA, FnB$

$Tn \square$

$Tn(\square A)$
$TnA$

$Tc \square$

$Tc(\square A)$
$TnA$

$Fc \square$

$Fc \square A$		
$TcA$	$FcA$	$FnA$

$Fn \square$

$Fc \square A$		
$TcA$	$FcA$	$FnA$

## Examples

- Let's show  $\square p \rightarrow p$  is a theorem of KTm.

$F(\square p \rightarrow p)$			
$Fc(\square p \rightarrow p)$			$Fn(\square p \rightarrow p)$
$Tn \square p, Fcp$	$Tc \square p, Fcp$	$Tc \square p, Fnp$	$Tn \square p, Fnp$
$Tnp, Fcp$	$Tnp, Fcp$	$Tnp, Fnp$	$Tnp, Fnp$

Each branch is closed, as we have contradictions in each branch. Therefore, formula  $\square p \rightarrow p$  is a theorem of KTm.

- Now we show that  $p \rightarrow \square p$  is not a theorem of KTm.

$F(p \rightarrow \square p)$											
$Fc(p \rightarrow \square p)$									$Fn(p \rightarrow \square p)$		
$Tnp, Fc \square p$			$Tcp, Fc \square p$			$Tcp, Fn \square p$			$Tnp, Fn \square p$		
$Tnp, Tcp$	$Tnp, Fcp$	$Tnp, Fnp$	$Tcp, Tcp$	$Tcp, Fcp$	$Tcp, Fnp$	$Tcp, Tcp$	$Tcp, Fcp$	$Tcp, Fnp$	$Tnp, Tcp$	$Tnp, Fcp$	$Tnp, Fnp$

In the selected cells, there is no contradiction; selected branches remain open, therefore, formula  $p \rightarrow \Box p$  is not a theorem of  $KT_m$ .

The tableau method in RMS efficiently tests validity by exploring truth value assignments, closing branches when contradictions arise. This adaptation enhances RMS's practicality, as noted in the Introduction, offering a systematic alternative to Kripkean model-checking.

## 6 Relationship Between Modal Operator Truth Values and System Generality

In this chapter, we examine the interplay between the axiomatic structure of modal systems  $K_m$ ,  $KD_m$ ,  $KT_m$ ,  $KT4_m$ , and  $S5_m$  and the truth values assigned to their modal operators ( $\Box$ ) in Resolution Matrix Semantics (RMS). These systems constitute a hierarchy in which the axioms of  $K_m$  form a subset of  $KD_m$ , those of  $KD_m$  a subset of  $KT_m$ , those of  $KT_m$  a subset of  $KT4_m$ , and those of  $KT4_m$  a subset of  $S5_m$ , embodying a progressive refinement of their logical constraints.

The truth values assigned to  $\Box$  exhibit a reverse pattern: the more general the system (with fewer axioms), the more indeterminate or vague its modal operator truth values, while the more specific systems (with more axioms) constrain these values progressively. This inverse relationship underscores a key insight of RMS: generality in axiomatic structure correlates with greater flexibility or ambiguity in semantic assignments. Here, we extend this analysis with philosophical reasoning on how the indeterminacy of  $\Box$  in RMS mirrors the degree of restriction on the accessibility relation  $R$  in Kripkean semantics, particularly with the updated, stricter definition of  $\Box$  for  $S5_m$ , and explore its implications for philosophy and science.

### 6.1 Axiomatic Hierarchy

The systems  $K_m$ ,  $KD_m$ ,  $KT_m$ ,  $KT4_m$ , and  $S5_m$  correspond to the Kripkean systems  $K$ ,  $KD$ ,  $KT$  ( $T$ ),  $KT4$  ( $S4$ ), and  $S5$ , respectively, with a clear progression in their axioms:

- **$K_m$ :** Includes only propositional tautologies and the Distribution Axiom ( $K: \Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$ ), making it the most general system with no restrictions on the accessibility relation.
- **$KD_m$ :** Adds the Seriality Axiom ( $D: \Box p \rightarrow \neg \Box \neg p$ ) to  $K_m$ , requiring at least one accessible world from each world.
- **$KT_m$ :** Extends  $KD_m$  with the Reflexivity Axiom ( $T: \Box p \rightarrow p$ ), ensuring every world accesses itself.

- **KT4m**: Further augments KTm with the Transitivity Axiom (4:  $\Box p \rightarrow \Box \Box p$ ), enforcing transitive accessibility.
- **S5m**: Adds the Symmetry Axiom (5:  $\neg \Box \neg p \rightarrow \Box \neg \Box \neg p$ ) to KT4m, creating a reflexive, transitive, and symmetric (equivalence) relation where all worlds are mutually accessible.

Thus, the set of axioms grows from Km to S5m ( $K \subseteq KD \subseteq KT \subseteq KT4 \subseteq S5$ ), reflecting increasing constraints on the underlying Kripkean accessibility relation: none (Km), serial (KDm), reflexive (KTm), reflexive-transitive (KT4m), and reflexive-transitive-symmetric (S5m).

## 6.2 Modal Operator Truth Values. Inverse Relationship

Let's compare the truth value assignments for  $\Box$  across the systems.

	$\Box p$				
p	Km	KDm	KTm	KT4m	S5m
tn	t	t	t	tn	tn
tc	f	f	f	f	fn
fc	t/f	t/f	f	f	fn
fn	t/f	f	f	f	fn

The progression of truth values reveals a clear pattern:

- Km has the most indeterminate values (t, f, t/f), with t/f for fc and fn, reflecting its lack of relational constraints.
- KDm narrows this slightly (t, f, t/f), with t/f only for fc, as seriality rules out  $\Box fn = t$ .
- KTm reduces indeterminacy further (t, f), eliminating t/f entirely, as reflexivity fixes  $\Box fc = f$ .
- KT4m constrains values to (tn, f), with  $\Box tn = tn$  and all others f, reflecting the strong reflexive-transitive structure.
- S5m achieves maximal determinacy, allowing only tn or fn, as symmetry, reflexivity, and transitivity enforce a binary necessity/falsity distinction across all mutually accessible worlds.

The moral holds: **the more general a system (fewer axioms), the vaguer its  $\Box$  truth values in RMS, reflecting fewer restrictions on R in Kripkean semantics.** Km's maximal indeterminacy (t, f, t/f) mirrors an unrestricted R—a blank slate for interpretation. As axioms like seriality, reflexivity,

transitivity, and symmetry accrue,  $\Box$ 's values narrow, with S5m's updated (tn, fn) matching KT4m's (tn, f) in determinacy but sharpening f to fn, reflecting the equivalence relation's total constraint. This evolution from Km's vagueness to S5m's precision captures a trade-off between generality and specificity, with RMS offering a truth-value lens that parallels Kripke's relational approach, revealing their deep structural kinship.

## 7. Applications and Insights

This chapter provides a brief sketch of possible applications of Resolution Matrix Semantics (RMS), exploring how RMS can be applied to fields such as deontic logic, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing, highlighting its ability to model complex, context-dependent reasoning with computational efficiency and philosophical depth. These applications not only demonstrate RMS's adaptability but also offer fresh insights into its potential to bridge theoretical logic with real-world challenges.

### 7.1 Promising Applications of RMS method in Deontic Logic and Other Modal Logic

RMS approach extends its truth-value-based framework beyond alethic modal systems (Km, KDm, KTm, KT4m, S5m) to deontic logic, which formalizes concepts of obligation (O), permission (P), and prohibition. Unlike Kripkean semantics, which relies on possible worlds and accessibility relations, RMS uses a finite set of truth values—necessary truth (tn), contingent truth (tc), contingent false (fc), and necessary false (fn)—augmented by indeterminate values (t, f, t/f). This approach offers a substantive alternative for modeling deontic operators by assigning truth values directly to normative statements, avoiding relational structures.

In deontic logic, the modal operator O (obligation) can be interpreted in RMS as follows: a proposition Op takes tn if p is obligatory in all contexts (e.g., a universal duty), tc if p is obligatory in the current context but not universally (e.g., a situational duty), fc if p is not obligatory but permissible in some contexts, and fn if p is forbidden (never obligatory). The indeterminate value t (tn or tc) can represent cases where p's obligation status is contextually ambiguous—obligatory in some sense but not precisely determinate—while f (fc or fn) indicates a lack of obligation, possibly ranging from permissible to prohibited. This setup allows RMS to capture nuances like deontic dilemmas (e.g.,  $Op \wedge O\neg p$ ) by exploring cases where conflicting obligations might resolve differently.

RMS's strength lies in its flexibility to handle deontic paradoxes without relational complexity. For instance, in addressing dilemmas or explosion (e.g.,  $Oa \wedge O\neg a \supset Ob$ ), RMS can assign indeterminate values to reflect uncertainty, then resolve them via sub-cases, preventing the classical explosion where contradictions imply arbitrary obligations, unlike world-based models. This approach draws inspiration from prior non-Kripkean matrix-based deontic systems [7, 8], adapting RMS's 4-valued structure to normative reasoning, with potential for further refinement in capturing strong versus weak obligations.

In a similar way, the RMS approach can be adapted to other branches of modal logic, such as epistemic (concerning knowledge and belief), doxastic (concerning belief and reasoning), temporal (concerning time and change), and dynamic (concerning actions and updates), among others.

## 7.2 Artificial Intelligence and Natural Language Processing

Resolution Matrix Semantics (RMS) brings a fresh perspective to artificial intelligence (AI) and natural language processing (NLP) by tackling the ambiguity and uncertainty that define human language and real-world reasoning. With its core set of determinate and indeterminate truth values, RMS moves beyond the rigid true/false binary of classical logic. This makes it an ideal tool for AI systems that grapple with imprecise data, offering a streamlined, truth-value-based alternative to the relational complexity of Kripkean semantics. Beyond language, RMS's flexibility extends to cutting-edge fields like quantum computing, where its handling of indeterminacy mirrors the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics, enriching its utility across technology and science.

In NLP, RMS excels at capturing the graded truth of everyday language. A statement like "the weather is pleasant" isn't simply true or false—it's true in some contexts, false in others—fitting naturally as  $t$ , resolving to  $tn$  (universally pleasant) or  $tc$  (pleasant now) depending on the situation. This nuance boosts AI tasks like sentiment analysis: a review saying "the film was okay" might take  $t$  for "positive sentiment," reflecting its ambivalence rather than forcing a binary label. RMS's mechanism resolves such indeterminacy systematically, enhancing chatbots, translations, and text understanding by aligning with the fuzzy, context-driven nature of human communication. The tailored tableau method further supports this by efficiently testing interpretations, ensuring practical applicability.

For AI decision-making, RMS shines in uncertain environments, such as autonomous vehicles or medical diagnostics. A vehicle sensor detecting "obstacle ahead" with partial confidence might warrant  $t$ — $tn$  if backed by multiple readings,  $tc$  if tentative—allowing cautious navigation without overreaction. In

medicine, "patient has condition X" could be  $t$  based on suggestive tests, guiding next steps without hasty judgments. This approach leverages RMS's focus on truth values over world-relations, simplifying computation for real-time systems. Epistemically, RMS models knowledge or belief—say, "the agent knows the path is clear"—with  $tn$  for certainty and  $f$  for doubt, supporting multi-agent coordination or belief updates with nuanced reasoning.

RMS's reach extends further into quantum mechanics, where its indeterminate values echo the superposition of quantum states. A particle's spin, indeterminate until measured, aligns with  $t/f$ —potentially resolving to  $tn$  (true across all contexts post-measurement) or  $fc$  (false here, true elsewhere)—mirroring quantum indeterminacy before collapse [11]. In quantum computing, RMS could represent qubit states as  $t$  pre-measurement, aiding algorithm design by mapping truth values to probabilities or amplitudes. This connection not only ties RMS to AI's theoretical underpinnings but also positions it as a bridge to quantum-enhanced NLP or decision systems, where probabilistic reasoning is key. By uniting language processing with quantum insights, RMS offers AI a versatile, philosophically rich framework that simplifies complexity while embracing the vagueness of reality.

## 8. Conclusion

This paper has presented Resolution Matrix Semantics (RMS) as an innovative, truth-value-based framework for modal logic, distinct from Kripkean relational semantics. By defining systems  $K_m$ ,  $KD_m$ ,  $KT_m$ ,  $KT4_m$ , and  $S5_m$  with a determinate and indeterminate truth value structure, RMS offers a robust alternative that captures modal nuances without relying on accessibility relations. The proofs of soundness and completeness confirm the logical rigor of Resolution Matrix Semantics (RMS), further supported by a tailored tableau method that systematically validates formulas with practical efficiency, while its applications in deontic logic, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing domains illustrate its versatility.

RMS's emphasis on truth over relations simplifies computation and enhances its relevance to philosophy, technology, and science.

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