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Recently, the Little Dragon Two and Poly-Dragon multivariate based public-key cryptosystems were proposed as efficient and secure schemes. In particular, the inventors of the two schemes claim that Little Dragon Two and Poly-Dragon resist algebraic cryptanalysis. In this paper, we show that MXL2, an algebraic attack method based on the XL algorithm and Ding’s concept of Mutants, is able to break Little Dragon Two with keys of length up to 229 bits and Poly-Dragon with keys of length up to 299. This contradicts the security claim for the proposed schemes and demonstrates the strength of MXL2 and the Mutant concept. This strength is further supported by experiments that show that in attacks on both schemes the MXL2 algorithm outperforms the Magma’s implementation of F4.

Recent developments in multivariate polynomial solving algorithms have made algebraic cryptanalysis a plausible threat to many cryptosystems. However, theoretical complexity estimates have shown this kind of attack unfeasible for most realistic applications. In this paper we present a strategy for computing Gröbner basis that challenges those complexity estimates. It uses a flexible partial enlargement technique together with reduced row echelon forms to generate lower degree elements–mutants. This new strategy surpasses old boundaries and obligates us to think of new paradigms for estimating complexity of Gröbner basis computation. The new proposed algorithm computed a Gröbner basis of a degree 2 random system with 32 variables and 32 equations using 30 GB which was never done before by any known Gröbner bases solver.

In this paper, we present an experimental analysis of HFE Challenge 2 (144 bit) type systems. We generate scaled versions of the full challenge fixing and guessing some unknowns. We use the MXL_3 algorithm, an efficient algorithm for computing Gröbner basis, to solve these scaled versions. We review the MXL_3 strategy and introduce our experimental results.

We propose a new efficient hardware implementation of Rainbow signature scheme. We enhance the implementation in three directions. First, we develop a new parallel hardware design for the Gauss-Jordan elimination, and solve a 12 ×12 system of linear equations with only 12 clock cycles. Second, a novel multiplier is designed to speed up multiplication of three elements over a finite field. Third, we design a novel partial multiplicative inverter to speed up the multiplicative inversion of finite field elements. Through further other minor optimizations of the parallelization process and by integrating the major optimizations above, we build a new hardware implementation, which takes only 198 clock cycles to generate a Rainbow signature, a new record in generating digital signatures and four times faster than the 804-clock-cycle Balasubramanian-Bogdanov-Carter-Ding-Rupp design with similar parameters.

In this paper, we present a new algorithm to solve algebraically the following lattice-related problems: 1) the small integer solution (SIS) problem under the condition: if the solution is bounded by an integer β in l_∞ norm, which we call a bounded SIS (BSIS) problem, and if the difference between the row dimension n and the column dimension m of the corresponding basis matrix is relatively small with respect the row dimension m; 2) the learning with errors (LWE) problems under the condition: if the errors are bounded - the errors do not span the whole prime finite field F_q but a fixed known subset of size D (D < q), which we call a learning with bounded errors (LWBE) problem. We will show that we can solve these problems with polynomial complexity.

In this paper, we introduce a new method to avoid zero reductions in Gröbner basis computation. We call this method LASyz, which stands for Lineal Algebra to compute Syzygies. LASyz uses exhaustively the information of both principal syzygies and non-trivial syzygies to avoid zero reductions. All computation is done using linear algebra techniques. LASyz is easy to understand and implement. The method does not require to compute Gröbner bases of subsequences of generators incrementally and it imposes no restrictions on the reductions allowed. We provide a complete theoretical foundation for the LASyz method and we describe an algorithm to compute Gröbner bases for zero dimensional ideals based on this foundation. A qualitative comparison with similar algorithms is provided and the performance of the algorithm is illustrated with experimental data.

The public key of the Oil-Vinegar scheme consists of a set of m quadratic equations in m + n variables over a finite field F_q. Kipnis and Shamir broke the balanced Oil-Vinegar scheme where d = n − m = 0 by finding equivalent keys of the cryptosytem. Later their method was extended by Kipnis et al to attack the unbalanced case where 0 < d < m and d is small with a complexity of O(q^{d−1} m^4). This method uses the matrices associated with the quadratic polynomials in the public key, which needs to be symmetric and invertible. In this paper, we give an optimized search method for Kipnis el al’s attack. Moreover, for the case that the finite field is of characteristic 2, we find the situation becomes very subtle, which, however, was totally neglected in the original work of Kipnis et al. We show that the Kipnis-Shamir method does not work if the field characteristic is 2 and d is a small odd number, and we fix the situation by proposing an alternative method and give an equivalent key recovery attack of complexity O(q^{d+1} m^4). We also prove an important experimental observation by Ding et al for the Kipnis-Shamir attack on balanced Oil-Vinegar schemes in characteristic 2.

In this paper, we present and prove the first closed formula bounding the degree of regularity of an HFE system over an arbitrary finite field. Though these bounds are not necessarily optimal, they can be used to deduce 1. if D, the degree of the corresponding HFE polynomial, and q, the size of the corresponding finite field, are fixed, inverting HFE system is polynomial for all fields; 2. if D is of the scale O(n^α) where n is the number of variables in an HFE system, and q is fixed, inverting HFE systems is quasi-polynomial for all fields. We generalize and prove rigorously similar results by Granboulan, Joux and Stern in the case when q = 2 that were communicated at Crypto 2006.

Let X = (x_1,..,x_n) and Y = (y_1,...,y_m) be a pair of corresponding plaintext and ciphertext for a cryptosystem. We define an embedded surface of this cryptosystem as any polynomial equation: E(X,Y)=E(x_1,..,x_n,y_1,...,y_m)=0, which is satisfied by all such pairs. In this paper, we present a new attack on the multivariate public key cryptosystems from Diophantine equations developed by Gao and Heindl by using the embedded surfaces associated to this family of multivariate cryptosystems.

In this paper, we propose an algebraic broadcast attack against NTRU, which recovers a single message encrypted multiple times using different NTRU public keys. Namely, when a message is broadcasted, under some reasonable assumptions, our attack can be completed in polynomial time and space. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first successful broadcast attack against NTRU.