This paper proves the nonlinear asymptotic stability of the Lane-Emden solutions for spherically symmetric motions of viscous gaseous stars if the adiabatic constant γ lies in the stability range (4/3, 2). It is shown that for small perturbations of a LaneEmden solution with same mass, there exists a unique global (in time) strong solution to the vacuum free boundary problem of the compressible Navier-Stokes-Poisson system with spherical symmetry for viscous stars, and the solution captures the precise physical behavior that the sound speed is C 1/2 -H¨older continuous across the vacuum boundary provided that γ lies in (4/3, 2). The key is to establish the global-in-time regularity uniformly up to the vacuum boundary, which ensures the large time asymptotic uniform convergence of the evolving vacuum boundary, density and velocity to those of the Lane-Emden solution with detailed convergence rates, and detailed large time behaviors of solutions near the vacuum boundary. In particular, it is shown that every spherical surface moving with the fluid converges to the sphere enclosing the same mass inside the domain of the Lane-Emden solution with a uniform convergence rate and the large time asymptotic states for the vacuum free boundary problem (1.1.2) are determined by the initial mass distribution and the total mass. To overcome the difficulty caused by the degeneracy and singular behavior near the vacuum free boundary and coordinates singularity at the symmetry center, the main ingredients of the analysis consist of combinations of some new weighted nonlinear functionals (involving both lower-order and higher-order derivatives) and space-time weighted energy estimates. The constructions of these weighted nonlinear functionals and space-time weights depend crucially on the structures of the Lane-Emden solution, the balance of pressure and gravitation, and the dissipation. Finally, the uniform boundedness of the acceleration of the vacuum boundary is also proved.

We provide a model of a decentralized, dynamic auction market platform (e.g., eBay) in which a large number of buyers and sellers participate in simultaneous, singleunit auctions each period. Our model accounts for the endogenous entry of agents and the impact of intertemporal optimization on bids. Solving our model with a finite number of bidders is computationally intractable due to the curse of dimensionality, so we prove that a continuum version of our model provides a good approximation of an equilibrium in the finite model. We use the approximation to estimate the structural primitives of our model using Kindle sales on eBay. We find that just over one third of Kindle auctions on eBay result in an inefficient allocation with deadweight loss amounting to 13.5% of total possible market surplus. We also find that partial centralization - for example, runnng half as many 2-unit, uniform price auctions each day - would eliminate a large fraction of the inefficiency, but yield lower seller revenues. Our results highlight the importance of understanding platform composition effects—selection of agents into the market—in assessing the implications of market design.

We carry out “exotic gluings” a la Carlotto-Schoen for asymptotically hyperbolic general relativistic initial data sets. In particular we obtain a direct construction of non-trivial initial data sets which are exactly hyperbolic in large regions extending to conformal infinity.

We study novel variations of Voronoi games (and associated random processes) that we call Voronoi choice games. These games provide a rich framework for studying questions regarding the power of small numbers of choices in multi-player, competitive scenarios in a geometric setting. Our work can be seen as a natural variation of the classical framework of Hotelling. While games based on Voronoi diagrams have appeared recently in the literature, our variations appear to be the first that take into account a notion of limited choices and the corresponding asymmetries in player strategies. As a problem example, suppose a group of n miners (or players) are staking land claims through the following process: each miner has m associated points in the unit square (or, for symmetry, the unit torus), so the kth miner will have associated points pk1, pk2, . . . , pkm. We generally here think of m as being a small constant, such as 2. Each miner chooses one of these points as the base point for their claim. Generally the points will be distinct for each miner. Each miner obtains mining rights for the area of the square that is closest to their chosen base; that is, they obtain the Voronoi cell corresponding to their chosen point in the Voronoi diagram of the n chosen points. Each player’s goal is simply to maximize the amount of land under their control. What can we say about the players’ strategy and the equilibria of such games? We provide several results on games in this setting. For example, we show that a correlated equilibrium can be found in polynomial time for the natural 1, 2, and 3-dimensional variations of the problem. For the one-dimensional version of the problem on the unit circle, we show that a pure Nash equilibrium exists when each player owns the part of the circle nearest to their point, but it is NP-hard to determine whether a pure Nash equilibrium exists when each player owns the arc starting from their point clockwise to the next point. We also consider a random version of the game, where players have m points chosen uniformly at random. We derive bounds on the expected number of pure Nash equilibria for a variation of the 1-dimensional game in this setting using interesting properties of random arc lengths on circles.

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