MIFARE Classic is the world’s most widely deployed RFID (radio-frequency identification) technology. It was claimed to be cryptographically protected by the proprietary Crypto-1 stream cipher. However, it proved inadequate after weaknesses in the design and implementation of Crypto-1 and MIFARE Classic started surfacing since late 2007 [7, 8, 12–17]. Some operators of MIFARE Classic-based systems reacted by upgrading to more secure alternatives such as MIFARE DESFire. However, many (especially in Asia) opted to “patch” MIFARE Classic instead. Their risk analysis might have gone as follows: “The most serious threat comes from efficient card-only attacks, where the attacker only needs an off-the-shelf reader and a PC to tamper a target tag. All efficient card-only attacks depend on certain implementation flaws. Ergo, if we just fix these flaws, we can stop the most serious attacks without an expensive infrastructure upgrade.” One such prominent case is “EasyCard 2.0,” today accepted in Taiwan as a means of electronic payment not only in public transportation but also in convenient stores, drug stores, eateries, cafes, supermarkets, book stores, movie theaters, etc. Obviously, the whole “patching” approach is questionable because Crypto-1 is fundamentally a weak cipher. In support of the proposition, we present a new card-only attack based on state-of-the-art algebraic differential cryptanalytic techniques [1, 2]. Still using the same cheap reader as previous attacks, it takes 2–15 min of computation on a PC to recover a secret key of EasyCard 2.0 after 10–20 h of data collection. We hope the new attack makes our point sufficiently clear, and we urge that all MIFARE-Classic operators with important transactions such as electronic payment upgrade their systems to the more secure alternatives soon.

Let$X$be a rearrangement-invariant Banach function space on$R$^{$n$}and let$V$^{1}$X$be the Sobolev space of functions whose gradient belongs to$X$. We give necessary and sufficient conditions on$X$under which$V$^{1}$X$is continuously embedded into BMO or into$L$_{∞}. In particular, we show that$L$_{$n, ∞$}is the largest rearrangement-invariant space$X$such that$V$^{1}$X$is continuously embedded into BMO and, similarly,$L$_{$n$, 1}is the largest rearrangement-invariant space$X$such that$V$^{1}$X$is continuously embedded into$L$_{∞}. We further show that$V$^{1}$X$is a subset of VMO if and only if every function from$X$has an absolutely continuous norm in$L$_{$n, ∞$}. A compact inclusion of$V$^{1}$X$into$C$^{0}is characterized as well.

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Using the geometric Satake correspondence, the Mirković–Vilonen cycles in the affine Grasssmannian give bases for representations of a semisimple group G. We prove that these bases are “perfect”, i.e. compatible with the action of the Chevelley generators of the positive half of the Lie algebra g. We compute this action in terms of intersection multiplicities in the affine Grassmannian. We prove that these bases stitch together to a basis for the algebra C[N] of regular functions on the unipotent subgroup. We compute the multiplication in this MV basis using intersection multiplicities in the Beilinson–Drinfeld Grassmannian, thus proving a conjecture of Anderson. In the third part of the paper, we define a map from C[N] to a convolution algebra of measures on the dual of the Cartan subalgebra of g. We characterize this map using the universal centralizer space of G. We prove that the measure associated with an MV basis element equals the Duistermaat–Heckman measure of the corresponding MV cycle. This leads to a proof of a conjecture of Muthiah. Finally, we use the map to measures to compare the MV basis and Lusztig’s dual semicanonical basis. We formulate conjectures relating the algebraic invariants of preprojective algebra modules (which underlie the dual semicanonical basis) and geometric invariants of MV cycles. In the appendix, we use these ideas to prove that the MV basis and the dual semicanonical basis do not coincide in SL_6 .