We treat a free spinless quantum particle moving on a configuration manifold which consists of two identical parts connected in one point. Most attention is paid to the three-dimensional case when these parts are halfspaces with Neumann condition on the boundary; we also discuss briefly a more general boundary conditions. The class of admissible Hamiltonians is constructed by means of the theory of self-adjoint extensions. Among them, particularly important is a two-parameter family whose elements are invariant with respect to exchange of the halfspaces; we compute the transmission coefficient for each of these extensions. We discuss also the motion on two planes considered in our recent paper, obtaining another characterization of the admissible Hamiltonians. In conclusion, the two situations are compared as models for point-contact spectroscopical experiments in thin metal films.

Let X = (x_1,..,x_n) and Y = (y_1,...,y_m) be a pair of corresponding plaintext and ciphertext for a cryptosystem. We define an embedded surface of this cryptosystem as any polynomial equation: E(X,Y)=E(x_1,..,x_n,y_1,...,y_m)=0, which is satisfied by all such pairs. In this paper, we present a new attack on the multivariate public key cryptosystems from Diophantine equations developed by Gao and Heindl by using the embedded surfaces associated to this family of multivariate cryptosystems.

In CT-RSA 2019, Bauer et al. have analyzed the case when the public key is reused for the NewHope key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), a second-round candidate in the NIST Post-quantum Standard process. They proposed an elegant method to recover coefficients ranging from −6 to 4 in the secret key. We repeat their experiments but there are two fundamental problems. First, even for coefficients in [−6, 4] we cannot recover at least 262 of them in each secret key with 1024 coefficients. Second, for the coefficient outside [−6, 4], they suggested an exhaustive search. But for each secret key on average there are 10 coefficients that need to be exhaustively searched, and each of them has 6 possibilities. This makes Bauer et al.’s method highly inefficient. We propose an improved method, which with 99.22% probability recovers all the coefficients ranging from −6 to 4 in the secret key. Then, inspired by Ding et al.’s key mismatch attack, we propose an efficient strategy which with a probability of 96.88% succeeds in recovering all the coefficients in the secret key. Experiments show that our proposed method is very efficient, which completes the attack in about 137.56 ms using the NewHope parameters.

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