Given a complete noncompact surface embedded in R3, we consider the Dirichlet Laplacian in the layer that is defined as a tubular neighborhood of constant width about . Using an intrinsic approach to the geometry of , we generalize the spectral results of the original paper by Duclos et al. [Commun. Math. Phys. 223, 13 (2001)] to the situation when does not possess poles. This enables us to consider topologically more complicated layers and state new spectral results. In particular, we are interested in layers built over surfaces with handles or several cylindrically symmetric ends. We also discuss more general regions obtained by compact deformations of certain .

For any 2⩽r⩽∞,n⩾2, we prove the existence of an open set U of C^r‑self‑mappings of any n‑manifold so that a generic map f in U displays a fast growth of the number of periodic points: the number of its n‑periodic points grows as fast as asked. This complements the works of Martens–de Melo–van Strien, Kaloshin, Bonatti–Díaz–Fisher and Turaev, to give a full answer to questions asked by Smale in 1967, Bowen in 1978 and Arnold in 1989, for any manifold of any dimension and for any smoothness. Furthermore, for any 1⩽r<∞ and any k⩾0, we prove the existence of an open set \hat U of k-parameter families in U such that for a generic (f_p)^p ∈ \hat U, for every ∥p∥⩽1, the map f_p displays a fast growth of the number of periodic points. This gives a negative answer to a problem asked by Arnold in 1992 in the finitely smooth case.

In CT-RSA 2019, Bauer et al. have analyzed the case when the public key is reused for the NewHope key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), a second-round candidate in the NIST Post-quantum Standard process. They proposed an elegant method to recover coefficients ranging from −6 to 4 in the secret key. We repeat their experiments but there are two fundamental problems. First, even for coefficients in [−6, 4] we cannot recover at least 262 of them in each secret key with 1024 coefficients. Second, for the coefficient outside [−6, 4], they suggested an exhaustive search. But for each secret key on average there are 10 coefficients that need to be exhaustively searched, and each of them has 6 possibilities. This makes Bauer et al.’s method highly inefficient. We propose an improved method, which with 99.22% probability recovers all the coefficients ranging from −6 to 4 in the secret key. Then, inspired by Ding et al.’s key mismatch attack, we propose an efficient strategy which with a probability of 96.88% succeeds in recovering all the coefficients in the secret key. Experiments show that our proposed method is very efficient, which completes the attack in about 137.56 ms using the NewHope parameters.

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