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We obtain a residue formula for an obstruction to the existence of coupled Kähler–Einstein metrics described by Futaki–Zhang. We apply it to an example studied separately by Futaki and Hultgren which is a toric Fano manifold with reductive automorphism, does not admit a Kähler–Einstein metric but still admits coupled Kähler–Einstein metrics.

Consider a system of periodic pendulum lattice with analytic weak coupling: i x ̈i +sinxi =−ε 􏰀 ∂xiβα(xj,xj+1,xj+2), xi =xi+N, i∈Z, j =i−2 where N 􏰃 3 is an integer, ε > 0 is a small parameter and the function βα is an analytic function of a certain form. It is shown in this paper that for small enough ε, the system admits motions such that the energy transfers between the pendulums in any predetermined order.

We investigate the non-BPS realm of 3d N=4 superconformal field theory by uniting the non-perturbative methods of the conformal bootstrap and supersymmetric localization, and utilizing special features of 3d N=4 theories such as mirror symmetry and a protected sector described by topological quantum mechanics (TQM). Supersymmetric localization allows for the exact determination of the conformal and flavor central charges, and the latter can be fed into the mini-bootstrap of the TQM to solve for a subset of the OPE data. We examine the implications of the Z_2 mirror action for the SCFT single- and mixed-branch crossing equations for the moment map operators, and apply numerical bootstrap to obtain universal constraints on OPE data for given flavor symmetry groups. A key ingredient in applying the bootstrap analysis is the determination of the mixed-branch superconformal blocks. Among other results, we show that the simplest known self-mirror theory with SU(2)×SU(2) flavor symmetry saturates our bootstrap bounds, which allows us to extract the non-BPS data and examine the self-mirror Z_2 symmetry thereof.

In 2004, the inventors of TTM cryptosystems proposed a new scheme that could resist the existing attacks, in particular, the Goubin-Courtois attack [GC00] and the Ding-Schmidt attack [DS03]. In this paper, we show the new version is still insecure, and we find that the polynomial components of the cipher (F_i) satisfy nontrivial equations of the special form ∑_{i=0}^{n−1} a_i x_i + ∑_{0≤j≤k≤m−1} b_{jk} F_j F_k + ∑_{j=0}^{m−1} c_j F_j + d = 0, which could be found with 2^{38} computations. From these equations and consequently the linear equations we derive from these equations for any given ciphertext, we can eliminate some of the variables x_i by restricting the functions to an affine subspace, such that, on this subspace, we can trivialize the "lock" polynomials, which are the key structure to ensure its security in this new instance of TTM. Then with method similar to Ding-Schmidt [DS03], we can find the corresponding plaintext for any given ciphertext. The total computational complexity of the attack is less than 2^{39} operations over a finite field of size 2^8. Our results are further confirmed by computer experiments.