Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystems (MPKCs) are often touted as future-proofing against Quantum Computers. It also has been known for efficiency compared to “traditional” alternatives. However, this advantage seems to erode with the increase of arithmetic resources in modern CPUs and improved algorithms, especially with respect to Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). In this paper, we show that hardware advances do not just favor ECC. Modern commodity CPUs also have many small integer arithmetic/logic resources, embodied by SSE2 or other vector instruction sets, that are useful for MPKCs. In particular, Intel’s SSSE3 instructions can speed up both public and private maps over prior software implementations of Rainbow-type systems up to 4×. Furthermore, MPKCs over fields of relatively small odd prime characteristics can exploit SSE2 instructions, supported by most modern 64-bit Intel and AMD CPUs. For example, Rainbow over F_{31} can be up to 2× faster than prior implementations of similarly-sized systems over F_{16}. Here a key advance is in using Wiedemann (as opposed to Gauss) solvers to invert the small linear systems in the central maps. We explain the techniques and design choices in implementing our chosen MPKC instances over fields such as F_{31}, F_{16} and F_{256}. We believe that our results can easily carry over to modern FPGAs, which often contain a large number of small multipliers, usable by odd-field MPKCs.

We propose and analyze a multivariate encryption scheme that uses odd characteristic and an embedding in its construction. This system has a very simple core map F(X) = X^2, allowing for efficient decryption. We also discuss ways to make this decryption faster with specific parameter choices. We give heuristic arguments along with experimental data to show that this scheme resists all known attacks.

The SMS4 block cipher is part of the Chinese WAPI wireless standard. This paper describes the specification and offers a specification for a toy version called simplified SMS4 (S-SMS4). We explore algebraic attacks on SMS4 and S-SMS4 using Gröbner basis attacks on equation systems over GF(2) and GF(2^8), as well as attacks using a SAT solver derived from the GF(2) model. A comparison of SAT and Gröbner basis attacks is provided.

This paper introduces a new efficient algorithm, called MXL_3, for computing Gröbner bases of zero-dimensional ideals. The MXL_3 is based on XL algorithm, mutant strategy, and a new sufficient condition for a set of polynomials to be a Gröbner basis. We present experimental results comparing the behavior of MXL_3 to F_4 on HFE and random generated instances of the MQ problem. In both cases the first implementation of the MXL_3 algorithm succeeds faster and uses less memory than Magma’s implementation of F_4.

This paper summarizes most of the main developments in the cryptanalysis of multivariate cryptosystems and discuss some problems that remain open. A strong emphasis is put on the symbolic computation tools that have been used to achieve these advances.