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Let$E$ç$S$^{1}be a set with Minkowski dimension$d(E)1$. We consider the Hardy-Littlewood maximal function, the Hilbert transform and the maximal Hilbert transform along the directions of$E$. The main result of this paper shows that these operators are bounded on$L$_{$rad$}^{$p$}(R^{2}) for$p>1+d(E)$and unbounded when$p<1+d(E)$. We also give some end-point results.

We study the existence of special Lagrangian submanifolds of log Calabi–Yau manifolds equipped with the complete Ricci-flat Kähler metric constructed by Tian and Yau. We prove that if X is a Tian–Yau manifold and if the compact Calabi–Yau manifold at infinity admits a single special Lagrangian, then X admits infinitely many disjoint special Lagrangians. In complex dimension 2, we prove that if Y is a del Pezzo surface or a rational elliptic surface and D∈|-KY| is a smooth divisor with D^2=d , then X=Y\D admits a special Lagrangian torus fibration, as conjectured by Strominger–Yau–Zaslow and Auroux. In fact, we show that X admits twin special Lagrangian fibrations, confirming a prediction of Leung and Yau. In the special case that Y is a rational elliptic surface or Y=P^2, we identify the singular fibers for generic data, thereby confirming two conjectures of Auroux. Finally, we prove that after a hyper-Kähler rotation, X can be compactified to the complement of a Kodaira type I_d fiber appearing as a singular fiber in a rational elliptic surface π: Y →P^1.

In this paper, we present a practical and provably secure two-pass authenticated key exchange protocol over ideal lattices, which is conceptually simple and has similarities to the Diffie-Hellman based protocols such as HMQV (CRYPTO 2005) and OAKE (CCS 2013). Our method does not involve other cryptographic primitives—in particular, it does not use signatures—which simplifies the protocol and enables us to base the security directly on the hardness of the ring learning with errors problem. The security is proven in the Bellare-Rogaway model with weak perfect forward secrecy in the random oracle model. We also give a one-pass variant of our two-pass protocol, which might be appealing in specific applications. Several concrete choices of parameters are provided, and a proof-of-concept implementation shows that our protocols are indeed practical.