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We study novel variations of Voronoi games (and associated random processes) that we call Voronoi choice games. These games provide a rich framework for studying questions regarding the power of small numbers of choices in multi-player, competitive scenarios in a geometric setting. Our work can be seen as a natural variation of the classical framework of Hotelling. While games based on Voronoi diagrams have appeared recently in the literature, our variations appear to be the first that take into account a notion of limited choices and the corresponding asymmetries in player strategies. As a problem example, suppose a group of n miners (or players) are staking land claims through the following process: each miner has m associated points in the unit square (or, for symmetry, the unit torus), so the kth miner will have associated points pk1, pk2, . . . , pkm. We generally here think of m as being a small constant, such as 2. Each miner chooses one of these points as the base point for their claim. Generally the points will be distinct for each miner. Each miner obtains mining rights for the area of the square that is closest to their chosen base; that is, they obtain the Voronoi cell corresponding to their chosen point in the Voronoi diagram of the n chosen points. Each player’s goal is simply to maximize the amount of land under their control. What can we say about the players’ strategy and the equilibria of such games? We provide several results on games in this setting. For example, we show that a correlated equilibrium can be found in polynomial time for the natural 1, 2, and 3-dimensional variations of the problem. For the one-dimensional version of the problem on the unit circle, we show that a pure Nash equilibrium exists when each player owns the part of the circle nearest to their point, but it is NP-hard to determine whether a pure Nash equilibrium exists when each player owns the arc starting from their point clockwise to the next point. We also consider a random version of the game, where players have m points chosen uniformly at random. We derive bounds on the expected number of pure Nash equilibria for a variation of the 1-dimensional game in this setting using interesting properties of random arc lengths on circles.

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Motivated by Kapranov's discovery of an $L_\infty$ algebra structure on the tangent complex of a K\"{a}hler manifold and Chen-Sti\'{e}non-Xu's construction of a Leibniz$_\infty[1]$ algebra associated with a Lie pair, we find a general method to construct Leibniz$_\infty[1]$ algebras ---from a DG derivation $\mathscr{A} \xrightarrow{\delta} \Omega$ of a commutative differential graded algebra $\mathscr{A}$ valued in a DG $\mathscr{A}$-module $\Omega$. We prove that for any $\delta$-connection $\nabla$ on $\mathcal{B}$, the $\A$-dual of $\Omega$, there associates a Leibniz$_\infty[1]$ $\mathscr{A}$-algebra $(\mathcal{B},\{\mathcal{R}^\nabla_k\}_{k\geq 1})$. Moreover, this construction is canonical, i.e., the isomorphism class of $(\mathcal{B},\{\mathcal{R}^\nabla_k\}_{k\geq 1})$ only depends on the homotopy class of $\delta$.

Budding yeast, which undergoes polarized growth during budding and mating, has been a useful model system to study cell polarization. Bud sites are selected differently in haploid and diploid yeast cells: haploid cells bud in an axial manner, while diploid cells bud in a bipolar manner. While previous studies have been focused on the molecular details of the bud site selection and polarity establishment, not much is known about how different budding patterns give rise to different functions at the population level. In this paper, we develop a two-dimensional agent-based model to study budding yeast colonies with cell-type specific biological processes, such as budding, mating, mating type switch, consumption of nutrients, and cell death. The model demonstrates that the axial budding pattern enhances mating probability at an early stage and the bipolar budding pattern improves colony development under nutrient limitation. Our results suggest that the frequency of mating type switch might control the trade-off between diploidization and inbreeding. The effect of cellular aging is also studied through our model. Based on the simulations, colonies initiated by an aged haploid cell show declined mating probability at an early stage and recover as the rejuvenated offsprings become the majority. Colonies initiated with aged diploid cells do not show disadvantage in colony expansion possibly due to the fact that young cells contribute the most to colony expansion.