We show existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Monge-Ampere equation on compact almost complex manifolds with non-integrable almost complex structure.

We prove a compactness principle for the anisotropic formulation of the Plateau’s problem in codimension one, along the same lines of previous works of the authors [DGM14, DPDRG15]. In particular, we perform a new strategy for proving the rectifiability of the minimal set, avoiding the Preiss’ Rectifiability Theorem.

We prove that the punctured generalized conifolds and punctured orbifolded conifolds are mirror symmetric under the SYZ program with quantum corrections. This mathematically confirms the gauge-theoretic prediction by Aganagic–Karch–L¨ust–Miemiec, and also provides a supportive evidence to Morrison’s conjecture that geometric transitions are reversed under mirror symmetry.

We study evolutionary games on graphs. The individuals of a population occupy the vertices of the graph and interact with their neighbors to receive payoff. We consider finite population size, regular graphs, probabilistic death-birth updating and weak selection. There are two types of strategies, A and B, and a payoff matrix [(a, b),(c, d)]. The initial condition is given by an arbitrary configuration where each vertex is occupied by either A or B. The conjugate initial condition is obtained by swapping A and B. We ask: when is the fixation probability of A for the original configuration greater than the fixation probability of B for the conjugate configuration? The answer is a linear condition of the form σa+b > c+σd. We calculate σ for any initial condition. For large population size we obtain the well known result σ = (k + 1)/(k − 1), but now this result extends to any mixed initial condition. As a specific example we study evolution of cooperation. We calculate the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for natural selection to favor the fixation of cooperators for any initial condition. We obtain results that specify which initial conditions reduce and which initial conditions increase the critical benefit-to-cost ratio. Adding more cooperators to the initial condition does not necessarily favor cooperation. But strategic placing of cooperators in a network can enhance the takeover of cooperation.

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