We prove several new results on the absolutely continuous spectra of perturbed one-dimensional Stark operators. First, we find new classes of perturbations, characterized mainly by smoothness conditions, which preserve purely absolutely continuous spectrum. Then we establish stability of the absolutely continuous spectrum in more general situations, where imbedded singular spectrum may occur. We present two kinds of optimal conditions for the stability of absolutely continuous spectrum: decay and smoothness. In the decay direction, we show that a sufficient (in the power scale) condition is |$q$($x$)|≤$C$(1+|$x$|)^{−1/4−ε}; in the smoothness direction, a sufficient condition in Hölder classes is$q$∈$C$^{1/2+ε}($R$). On the other hand, we show that there exist potentials which both satisfy |$q$($x$)|≤$C$(1+|$x$|)^{−1/4}and belong to$C$^{1/2}($R$) for which the spectrum becomes purely singular on the whole real axis, so that the above results are optimal within the scales considered.

No abstract uploaded!

No abstract uploaded!

No abstract uploaded!

Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE)-based key exchange is one of the most efficient and secure primitive for post-quantum cryptography. One common approach to achieve key exchange over RLWE is error reconciliation. Recently, an efficient attack against reconciliation-based RLWE key exchange protocols with reused keys was proposed. This attack can recover a long-term private key if a key pair is reused. We also know that in the real world, key reuse is commonly adopted in applications like the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to improve performance. Directly motivated by this attack, we construct a new randomized RLWE-based key exchange protocol against this attack. Our lightweight approach incorporates an additional ephemeral public error term into key exchange materials, so that this attack no longer works. With the same attack, we practically show that the signal value of our protocol is indistinguishable from uniform random, therefore, this attack no longer works. We explain how the attack fails, present 200-bit classic and 80-bit quantum secure parameter choice, efficient implementations, comparisons and discussion. Benchmark shows our protocol is truly efficient and even faster than related vulnerable protocols.