An axiomatic formulation is presented for point processes which may be interpreted as ordered sequences of points randomly located on the real line. Such concepts as forward recurrence times and number of points in intervals are defined and related in set-theoretic Note that for α∈$A$,$G$^{α}may not cover$G$_{α}as a convex subgroup and so we cannot use Theorem 1.1 to prove this result. Moreover, all that we know about the$G$^{α}/G_{α}is that each is an extension of a trivially ordered subgroup by a subgroup of$R$. It$B$is a plenary subset of$A$, then there exists a$v$-isomorphism μ of$G$into$V(B, G$^{β}/G_{β}), but whether or not μ is an$o$-isomorphism is not known.

In this work, we give a geometric interpretation to the Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). The geometric view is based on the intrinsic relation between Optimal Mass Transportation (OMT) theory and convex geometry, and leads to a variational approach to solve the Alexandrov problem: constructing a convex polytope with prescribed face normals and volumes. By using the optimal transportation view of GAN model, we show that the discriminator computes the Wasserstein distance via the Kantorovich potential, the generator calculates the transportation map. For a large class of transportation costs, the Kantorovich potential can give the optimal transportation map by a close-form formula. Therefore, it is sufficient to solely optimize the discriminator. This shows the adversarial competition can be avoided, and the computational architecture can be simplified. Preliminary experimental results show the geometric method outperforms the traditional Wasserstein GAN for approximating probability measures with multiple clusters in low dimensional space.

No abstract uploaded!

MIFARE Classic is the world’s most widely deployed RFID (radio-frequency identification) technology. It was claimed to be cryptographically protected by the proprietary Crypto-1 stream cipher. However, it proved inadequate after weaknesses in the design and implementation of Crypto-1 and MIFARE Classic started surfacing since late 2007 [7, 8, 12–17]. Some operators of MIFARE Classic-based systems reacted by upgrading to more secure alternatives such as MIFARE DESFire. However, many (especially in Asia) opted to “patch” MIFARE Classic instead. Their risk analysis might have gone as follows: “The most serious threat comes from efficient card-only attacks, where the attacker only needs an off-the-shelf reader and a PC to tamper a target tag. All efficient card-only attacks depend on certain implementation flaws. Ergo, if we just fix these flaws, we can stop the most serious attacks without an expensive infrastructure upgrade.” One such prominent case is “EasyCard 2.0,” today accepted in Taiwan as a means of electronic payment not only in public transportation but also in convenient stores, drug stores, eateries, cafes, supermarkets, book stores, movie theaters, etc. Obviously, the whole “patching” approach is questionable because Crypto-1 is fundamentally a weak cipher. In support of the proposition, we present a new card-only attack based on state-of-the-art algebraic differential cryptanalytic techniques [1, 2]. Still using the same cheap reader as previous attacks, it takes 2–15 min of computation on a PC to recover a secret key of EasyCard 2.0 after 10–20 h of data collection. We hope the new attack makes our point sufficiently clear, and we urge that all MIFARE-Classic operators with important transactions such as electronic payment upgrade their systems to the more secure alternatives soon.

No abstract uploaded!