In 2017, Ward Beullens et al. submitted Lifted Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar [3], which is a modification to the Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar Scheme by Patarin. Previously, Ding et al. proposed the Subfield Differential Attack [22] which prompted a change of parameters by the authors of LUOV for the second round of the NIST post quantum standardization competition [4]. In this paper we propose a modification to the Subfield Differential Attack called the Nested Subset Differential Attack which fully breaks half of the parameter sets put forward. We also show by experimentation that this attack is practically possible to do in under 210 min for the level I security parameters and not just a theoretical attack. The Nested Subset Differential attack is a large improvement of the Subfield differential attack which can be used in real world circumstances. Moreover, we will only use what is called the “lifted” structure of LUOV, and our attack can be thought as a development of solving “lifted” quadratic systems.

The mutual intensity and its equivalent phase-space representations quantify an optical field's state of coherence and are important tools in the study of light propagation and dynamics, but they can only be estimated indirectly from measurements through a process called coherence retrieval, otherwise known as phase-space tomography. As practical considerations often rule out the availability of a complete set of measurements, coherence retrieval is usually a challenging high-dimensional ill-posed inverse problem. In this paper, we propose a trace-regularized optimization model for coherence retrieval and a provably convergent adaptive accelerated proximal gradient algorithm for solving the resulting problem. Applying our model and algorithm to both simulated and experimental data, we demonstrate an improvement in reconstruction quality over previous models as well as an increase in convergence speed compared to existing first-order methods.

In this paper we show how to totally break the fully homomorphic encryption scheme of eprint 2017/458.

We combine the method of searching for an invariant subspace of the unbalanced Oil and Vinegar signature scheme and the Minrank method to defeat the new TTS signature scheme, which was suggested for low-cost smart card applications at CHES 2004. We show that the attack complexity is less than 2^{50}.

In this paper, we show the claims in the original Kipnis-Shamir attack on the HFE cryptosystems and the improved attack by Courtois that the complexity of the attacks is polynomial in terms of the number of variables are invalid. We present computer experiments and a theoretical argument using basic algebraic geometry to explain why it is so. Furthermore we show that even with the help of the powerful new Gröbner basis algorithm like F_4, the Kipnis-Shamir attack still should be exponential but not polynomial. This again is supported by our theoretical argument.