We characterize probability measure with finite moment of any order in terms of the symmetric difference operators of their Fourier transforms. By using our new characterization, we prove the continuity f (t, v)\in C ((0,\infty), L^ 1_ {2k-2+ }) , where f (t, v)\in C ((0,\infty), L^ 1_ {2k-2+ }) stands for the density of unique measure-valued solution f (t, v)\in C ((0,\infty), L^ 1_ {2k-2+ }) of the Cauchy problem for the homogeneous non-cutoff Boltzmann equation, with Maxwellian molecules, corresponding to a probability measure initial datum f (t, v)\in C ((0,\infty), L^ 1_ {2k-2+ }) satisfying\[\int| v|^{2k-2+ } dF_0 (v)<\infty, 0\leq < 2, k= 2, 3, 4,\cdots\] provided that f (t, v)\in C ((0,\infty), L^ 1_ {2k-2+ }) is not a single Dirac mass.

For projective conifold transitions between Calabi-Yau threefolds X and Y, with X close to Y in the moduli, we show that the combined information provided by the A model (Gromov--Witten theory in all genera) and B model (variation of Hodge structures) on X, linked along the vanishing cycles, determines the corresponding combined information on Y. Similar result holds in the reverse direction when linked with the exceptional curves.

We determine regularity results for energy minimizing maps from an n-dimensional Riemannian polyhedral complex X into a CAT(1) space. Provided that the metric on X is Lipschitz regular, we prove Hölder regularity with Hölder constant and exponent dependent on the total energy of the map and the metric on the domain. Moreover, at points away from the (n−2)-skeleton, we improve the regularity to locally Lipschitz. Finally, for points x ∈ X^{(k)} with k ≤ n−2, we demonstrate that the Hölder exponent depends on geometric and combinatorial data of the link of x ∈ X.

In this paper, we study how the algebraic attack on the HFE multivariate public key cryptosystem works if we build an HFE cryptosystem on a finite field whose characteristic is not two. Using some very basic algebraic geometry we argue that when the characteristic is not two the algebraic attack should not be polynomial in the range of the parameters which are used in practical applications. We further support our claims with extensive experiments using the Magma implementation of F_4, which is currently the best publicly available implementation of the Gröbner basis algorithm. We present a new variant of the HFE cryptosystems, where we project the public key of HFE to a space of one dimension lower. This protects the system from the Kipnis-Shamir attack and makes the decryption process avoid multiple candidates for the plaintext. We propose an example for a practical application on GF(11) and suggest a test challenge on GF(7).

The SimpleMatrix encryption scheme as proposed by Tao et al. \cite{TD13} is one of the very few existing approaches to create a secure and efficient encryption scheme on the basis of multivariate polynomials. However, in its basic version, decryption failures occur with non-negligible probability. Although this problem has been addressed in several papers \cite{DP14,TX15}, a general solution to it is still missing. In this paper we propose an improved version of the SimpleMatrix scheme, which eliminates decryption failures completely and therefore solves the biggest problem of the SimpleMatrix encryption scheme. Additionally, we propose a second version of the scheme, which reduces the blow-up factor between plain and ciphertext size to a value arbitrary close to 1.