We introduce a parallel machine scheduling problem in which the processing times of jobs are not given in advance but are determined by a system of linear constraints. The objective is to minimize the makespan, i.e., the maximum job completion time among all feasible choices. This novel problem is motivated by various real-world application scenarios. We discuss the computational complexity and algorithms for various settings of this problem. In particular, we show that if there is only one machine with an arbitrary number of linear constraints, or there is an arbitrary number of machines with no more than two linear constraints, or both the number of machines and the number of linear constraints are fixed constants, then the problem is polynomial-time solvable via solving a series of linear programming problems. If both the number of machines and the number of constraints are inputs of the problem instance, then the problem is NP-Hard. We further propose several approximation algorithms for the latter case.

This paper focuses on pricing and vertical cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain. Using a Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer acts as the game leader and the retailer acts as the game follower, we obtain closed-form equilibrium solution and explicitly show how pricing and advertising decisions are made. When market demand decreases exponentially with respect to the retail price and increases with respect to national and local advertising expenditures in an additive way, the manufacturer benefits from providing percentage reimbursement for the retailer’s local advertising expenditure when demand price elasticity is large enough. Whether the manufacturer benefits from cooperative advertising is also closely related to supply chain member’s relative advertising efficiency. In the decision for adopting coop advertising strategy, it is critical for the manufacturer to identify how market demand depends on national and local advertisements. The findings from this research can enhance our understanding of cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain with price-dependent demand.

We study the non-klt locus of singularities of pairs. We show that given a pair (X, B) and a projective morphism X → Z with connected fibres such that −(KX +B) is nef over Z, the non-klt locus of (X, B) has at most two connected components near each fibre of X → Z. This was conjectured by Hacon and Han. In a different direction we answer a question of Mark Gross on connectedness of the non-klt loci of certain pairs. This is motivated by constructions in Mirror Symmetry.

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