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Consider electromagnetic waves in two-dimensional honeycomb structured media. The properties of transverse electric (TE) polarized waves are determined by the spectral properties of the elliptic operator L^A=-\nabla_x·A(x) \nabla_x, where A(x) is Λ_h− periodic (Λ_h denotes the equilateral triangular lattice), and such that with respect to some origin of coordinates, A(x) is PC− invariant (A(x)=\overline{A(-x)}) and 120° rotationally invariant (A(R*x)=R*A(x)R, where R is a 120° rotation in the plane). We first obtain results on the existence, stability and instability of Dirac points, conical intersections between two adjacent Floquet-Bloch dispersion surfaces. We then show that the introduction through small and slow variations of a domain wall across a line-defect gives rise to the bifurcation from Dirac points of highly robust (topologically protected) edge states. These are time-harmonic solutions of Maxwell's equations which are propagating parallel to the line-defect and spatially localized transverse to it. The transverse localization and strong robustness to perturbation of these edge states is rooted in the protected zero mode of a one-dimensional effective Dirac operator with spatially varying mass term. These results imply the existence of uni-directional propagating edge states for two classes of time-reversal invariant media in which C symmetry is broken: magneto-optic media and bi-anisotropic media. Our analysis applies and extends the tools previously developed in the context of honeycomb Schrödinger operators.

In a symmetric space of noncompact type X = G=K oriented geodesic segments correspond modulo isometries to vectors in the Euclidean Weyl chamber. We can hence assign vector valued lengths to segments. Our main result is a system of homogeneous linear inequalities, which we call the generalized triangle inequalities or stability inequalities, describing the restrictions on the vector valued side lengths of oriented polygons. It is based on the mod 2 Schubert calculus in the real Grassmannians G=P for maximal parabolic subgroups P. The side lengths of polygons in Euclidean buildings are studied in the related paper [KLM2]. Applications of the geomet- ric results in both papers to algebraic group theory are given in[KLM3].

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We study novel variations of Voronoi games (and associated random processes) that we call Voronoi choice games. These games provide a rich framework for studying questions regarding the power of small numbers of choices in multi-player, competitive scenarios in a geometric setting. Our work can be seen as a natural variation of the classical framework of Hotelling. While games based on Voronoi diagrams have appeared recently in the literature, our variations appear to be the first that take into account a notion of limited choices and the corresponding asymmetries in player strategies. As a problem example, suppose a group of n miners (or players) are staking land claims through the following process: each miner has m associated points in the unit square (or, for symmetry, the unit torus), so the kth miner will have associated points pk1, pk2, . . . , pkm. We generally here think of m as being a small constant, such as 2. Each miner chooses one of these points as the base point for their claim. Generally the points will be distinct for each miner. Each miner obtains mining rights for the area of the square that is closest to their chosen base; that is, they obtain the Voronoi cell corresponding to their chosen point in the Voronoi diagram of the n chosen points. Each player’s goal is simply to maximize the amount of land under their control. What can we say about the players’ strategy and the equilibria of such games? We provide several results on games in this setting. For example, we show that a correlated equilibrium can be found in polynomial time for the natural 1, 2, and 3-dimensional variations of the problem. For the one-dimensional version of the problem on the unit circle, we show that a pure Nash equilibrium exists when each player owns the part of the circle nearest to their point, but it is NP-hard to determine whether a pure Nash equilibrium exists when each player owns the arc starting from their point clockwise to the next point. We also consider a random version of the game, where players have m points chosen uniformly at random. We derive bounds on the expected number of pure Nash equilibria for a variation of the 1-dimensional game in this setting using interesting properties of random arc lengths on circles.