We construct SYZ mirrors of the local Calabi–Yau manifolds of type à by developing an equivariant SYZ theory for the toric Calabi–Yau manifolds of infinite-type. The equations for the SYZ mirrors involve the Riemann theta functions and generating functions of the open Gromov–Witten invariants. We obtain explicit formulae for the generating functions which are open analogs of the Yau–Zaslow formula in dimension 2, and show that they have nice modular properties. We also relate the SYZ mirror pairs with mirror symmetry for the abelian varieties and hypersurfaces therein.

We study certain six dimensional theories arising on (p, q) brane webs living on R × S. These brane webs are dual to toric elliptically fibered Calabi-Yau threefolds. The compactification of the space on which the brane web lives leads to a deformation of the partition functions equivalent to the elliptic deformation of the Ding-Iohara algebra. We compute the elliptic version Dotsenko-Fateev integrals and show that they reproduce the instanton counting of the six dimensional theory.

A compactness framework is established for approximate solutions to subsonicsonic flows governed by the steady full Euler equations for compressible fluids in arbitrary dimension. The existing compactness frameworks for the two-dimensional irrotational case do not directly apply for the steady full Euler equations in higher dimensions. The new compactness framework we develop applies for both non-homentropic and rotational flows. One of our main observations is that the compactness can be achieved by using only natural weak estimates for the mass balance and the vorticity, along with the Bernoulli law and the entropy relation, through a more delicate analysis on the phase space. As direct applications, we establish two existence theorems for multidimensional subsonic-sonic full Euler flows through infinitely long nozzles.

A compactness framework is formulated for the incompressible limit of approximate solutions with weak uniform bounds with respect to the adiabatic exponent for the steady Euler equations for compressible fluids in any dimension. One of our main observations is that the compactness can be achieved by using only natural weak estimates for the mass conservation and the vorticity. Another observation is that the incompressibility of the limit for the homentropic Euler flow is directly from the continuity equation, while the incompressibility of the limit for the full Euler flow is from a combination of all the Euler equations. As direct applications of the compactness framework, we establish two incompressible limit theorems for multidimensional steady Euler flows through infinitely long nozzles, which lead to two new existence theorems for the corresponding problems for multidimensional steady incompressible Euler equations.

We study novel variations of Voronoi games (and associated random processes) that we call Voronoi choice games. These games provide a rich framework for studying questions regarding the power of small numbers of choices in multi-player, competitive scenarios in a geometric setting. Our work can be seen as a natural variation of the classical framework of Hotelling. While games based on Voronoi diagrams have appeared recently in the literature, our variations appear to be the first that take into account a notion of limited choices and the corresponding asymmetries in player strategies. As a problem example, suppose a group of n miners (or players) are staking land claims through the following process: each miner has m associated points in the unit square (or, for symmetry, the unit torus), so the kth miner will have associated points pk1, pk2, . . . , pkm. We generally here think of m as being a small constant, such as 2. Each miner chooses one of these points as the base point for their claim. Generally the points will be distinct for each miner. Each miner obtains mining rights for the area of the square that is closest to their chosen base; that is, they obtain the Voronoi cell corresponding to their chosen point in the Voronoi diagram of the n chosen points. Each player’s goal is simply to maximize the amount of land under their control. What can we say about the players’ strategy and the equilibria of such games? We provide several results on games in this setting. For example, we show that a correlated equilibrium can be found in polynomial time for the natural 1, 2, and 3-dimensional variations of the problem. For the one-dimensional version of the problem on the unit circle, we show that a pure Nash equilibrium exists when each player owns the part of the circle nearest to their point, but it is NP-hard to determine whether a pure Nash equilibrium exists when each player owns the arc starting from their point clockwise to the next point. We also consider a random version of the game, where players have m points chosen uniformly at random. We derive bounds on the expected number of pure Nash equilibria for a variation of the 1-dimensional game in this setting using interesting properties of random arc lengths on circles.