Mean-Field Games are games with a continuum of players that incorporate the time-dimension through a control-theoretic approach. Recently, simpler approaches relying on the Best Reply Strategy have been proposed. They assume that the agents navigate their strategies towards their goal by taking the direction of steepest descent of their cost function (i.e. the opposite of the utility function). In this paper, we explore the link between Mean-Field Games and the Best Reply Strategy approach. This is done by introducing a Model Predictive Control framework, which consists of setting the Mean-Field Game over a short time interval which recedes as time moves on. We show that the Model Predictive Control offers a compromise between a possibly unrealistic Mean-Field Game approach and the sub-optimal Best Reply Strategy.

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We introduce a parallel machine scheduling problem in which the processing times of jobs are not given in advance but are determined by a system of linear constraints. The objective is to minimize the makespan, i.e., the maximum job completion time among all feasible choices. This novel problem is motivated by various real-world application scenarios. We discuss the computational complexity and algorithms for various settings of this problem. In particular, we show that if there is only one machine with an arbitrary number of linear constraints, or there is an arbitrary number of machines with no more than two linear constraints, or both the number of machines and the number of linear constraints are fixed constants, then the problem is polynomial-time solvable via solving a series of linear programming problems. If both the number of machines and the number of constraints are inputs of the problem instance, then the problem is NP-Hard. We further propose several approximation algorithms for the latter case.

We develop a generic game platform that can be used to model various real-world systems with multiple intelligent cloud-computing pools and parallel-queues for resources-competing users. Inside the platform, the software structure is modelled as Blockchain. All the users are associated with Big Data arrival streams whose random dynamics is modelled by triply stochastic renewal reward processes (TSRRPs). Each user may be served simultaneously by multiple pools while each pool with parallel- servers may also serve multi-users at the same time via smart policies in the Blockchain, e.g. a Nash equilibrium point myopically at each fixed time to a game-theoretic scheduling problem. To illustrate the effectiveness of our game platform, we model the performance measures of its internal data flow dynamics (queue length and workload processes) as reflecting diffusion with regime-switchings (RDRSs) under our scheduling policies. By RDRS models, we can prove our myopic game-theoretic policy to be an asymptotic Pareto minimal-dual-cost Nash equilibrium one globally over the whole time horizon to a randomly evolving dynamic game problem. Iterative schemes for simulating our multi-dimensional RDRS models are also developed with the support of numerical comparisons.

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