Key exchange protocols from the learning with errors (LWE) problem share many similarities with the Diffie–Hellman–Merkle (DHM) protocol, which plays a central role in securing our Internet. Therefore, there has been a long time effort in designing authenticated key exchange directly from LWE to mirror the advantages of DHM-based protocols. In this paper, we revisit signal leakage attacks and show that the severity of these attacks against LWE-based (authenticated) key exchange is still underestimated. In particular, by converting the problem of launching a signal leakage attack into a coding problem, we can significantly reduce the needed number of queries to reveal the secret key. Specifically, for DXL-KE we reduce the queries from 1,266 to only 29, while for DBS-KE, we need only 748 queries, a great improvement over the previous 1,074,434 queries. Moreover, our new view of signals as binary codes enables recognizing vulnerable schemes more easily. As such we completely recover the secret key of a password-based authenticated key exchange scheme by Dabra et al. with only 757 queries and partially reveal the secret used in a two-factor authentication by Wang et al. with only one query. The experimental evaluation supports our theoretical analysis and demonstrates the efficiency and effectiveness of our attacks. Our results caution against underestimating the power of signal leakage attacks as they are applicable even in settings with a very restricted number of interactions between adversary and victim.

Lattice problem such as NTRU problem and LWE problem is widely used as the security base of post-quantum cryptosystems. And currently doing lattice reduction by BKZ algorithm is the most efficient way to solve it. In this paper, we give several further improvements on BKZ algorithm, which can be used for different SVP subroutines base on both enumeration and sieving. These improvements in combination provide a speed up of 2^{3~4} in total. It is significant in concrete attacks. Using these new techniques, we solved the 656 dimensional ideal lattice challenge in only 380 thread hours (also with a enumeration based SVP subroutine), much less than the previous records (which costs 4600 thread hours in total). With these improvements enabled, we can still simulate the new BKZ algorithm easily. One can also use this simulator to find the blocksize strategy (and the corresponding cost) to make Pot of the basis (defined in section 5.2) decrease as fast as possible, which means the length of the first basis vector decrease the fastest if we accept the GSA assumption. It is useful for analyzing concrete attacks on lattice-based cryptography.

Often times, the ability to distinguish between random data and a public key can leads to an attack against the cryptosystem itself. In this paper, we will show experimentally a very efficient distinguisher based on the distribution of ranks of the symmetric matrices associated with the central map in the multivariate cryptosystem HFE when the degree D of the central map is very small.

Our purpose is to compare how much the F5 algorithm can gain in efficiency compared to the F4 algorithm. This can be achieve as the F5 algorithm uses the concept of signatures to foresee potential useless computation which the F4 algorithm might make represented by zero rows in the reduction of a large matrix. We experimentally show that this is a modest increase in efficiency for the parameters we tested.

In 2017, Ward Beullenset al.submitted Lifted Unbalanced Oil andVinegar, which is a modification to the Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar Schemeby Patarin. Previously, Dinget al.proposed the Subfield Differential Attack which prompted a change of parameters by the authors of LUOV for the sec-ond round of the NIST post quantum standardization competition. In this paper we propose a modification to the Subfield Differential Attack called the Nested Subset Differential Attack which fully breaks half of the pa-rameter sets put forward. We also show by experimentation that this attack ispractically possible to do in under 210 minutes for the level I security param-eters and not just a theoretical attack. The Nested Subset Differential attack isa large improvement of the Subfield differential attack which can be used inreal world circumstances. Moreover, we will only use what is called the "lifted"structure of LUOV, and our attack can be thought as a development of solving"lifted" quadratic systems.