Let each point of a homogeneous Poisson process in ℝ^{$d$}independently be equipped with a random number of stubs (half-edges) according to a given probability distribution$μ$on the positive integers. We consider translation-invariant schemes for perfectly matching the stubs to obtain a simple graph with degree distribution$μ$. Leaving aside degenerate cases, we prove that for any$μ$there exist schemes that give only finite components as well as schemes that give infinite components. For a particular matching scheme which is a natural extension of Gale–Shapley stable marriage, we give sufficient conditions on$μ$for the absence and presence of infinite components.

In a uniform random recursive$k$-directed acyclic graph, there is a root, 0, and each node in turn, from 1 to$n$, chooses$k$uniform random parents from among the nodes of smaller index. If$S$_{$n$}is the shortest path distance from node$n$to the root, then we determine the constant$σ$such that$S$_{$n$}/log$n$→$σ$in probability as$n$→∞. We also show that max_{1≤$i$≤$n$}$S$_{$i$}/log$n$→$σ$in probability.

General upper tail estimates are given for counting edges in a random induced subhypergraph of a fixed hypergraph ℋ, with an easy proof by estimating the moments. As an application we consider the numbers of arithmetic progressions and Schur triples in random subsets of integers. In the second part of the paper we return to the subgraph counts in random graphs and provide upper tail estimates in the rooted case.

No abstract uploaded!

No abstract uploaded!

This paper discusses how to solve filtering problem for a class of continuous nonlinear time-varying systems via Duncan-Mortensen-Zakai (DMZ) equation. In this paper, the original DMZ equation is changed into Kolmogorov forward equation (KFE) by exponential transformations in each time interval, and then under some assumptions, the KFE can be transformed into time-varying Schr\"odinger equation which can be solved explicitly. The novelty of this paper lies in how to transform the KFE into Schr\"odinger equation. As a direct application, the results of \cite{yau 2004} are extended for time-varying Yau systems.

This paper focuses on pricing and vertical cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain. Using a Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer acts as the game leader and the retailer acts as the game follower, we obtain closed-form equilibrium solution and explicitly show how pricing and advertising decisions are made. When market demand decreases exponentially with respect to the retail price and increases with respect to national and local advertising expenditures in an additive way, the manufacturer benefits from providing percentage reimbursement for the retailer’s local advertising expenditure when demand price elasticity is large enough. Whether the manufacturer benefits from cooperative advertising is also closely related to supply chain member’s relative advertising efficiency. In the decision for adopting coop advertising strategy, it is critical for the manufacturer to identify how market demand depends on national and local advertisements. The findings from this research can enhance our understanding of cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain with price-dependent demand.

This paper studies the inventory management problem of dual channels operated by one vendor. Demands of dual channels are inventory-level-dependent.We propose a multi-period stochastic dynamic programming model which shows that under mild conditions, the myopic inventory policy is optimal for the infinite horizon problem. To investigate the importance of capturing demand dependency on inventory levels, we consider a heuristic where the vendor ignores demand dependency on inventory levels, and compare the optimal inventory levels with those recommended by the heuristic. Through numerical examples, we show that the vendor may order less for dual channels than those recommended by the heuristic, and the difference between the inventory levels in the two cases can be so large that the demand dependency on inventory levels cannot be neglected. In the end, we numerically examine the impact of different ways to treat unmet demand and obtain some managerial insights.

This paper studies the eect of risk-aversion in the competitive newsvendor game. Multiple newsvendors with risk-averse preferences face a random demand and the demand is allocated proportionally to their inventory levels. Each newsvendor aims to maximize his expected utility instead of his expected prot. Assuming a general form of risk-averse utility function, we prove that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in this game, and it is also unique under certain conditions. We nd that the order quantity of each newsvendor is decreasing in the degree of risk-aversion and increasing in the initial wealth. Newsvendors with moderate preferences of risk-aversion make more prots compared with the risk-neutral situation. We also discuss the joint eect of risk-aversion and competition. If the eect of risk-aversion is strong enough to dominate the eect of competition, the total inventory level under competition will be lower than that under centralized decision-making.

This paper studies the capacity allocation game between duopolistic airlines which could offer callable products. Previous literature has shown that callable products provide a riskless source of additional rev- enue for a monopolistic airline. We examine the impact of the introduction of callable products on the revenues and the booking limits of duopolistic airlines. The analytical results demonstrate that, when there is no spill of low-fare customers, offering callable products is a dominant strategy of both airlines and provides Pareto gains to both airlines. When customers of both fare classes spill, offering callable products is no longer a dominant strategy and may harm the revenues of the airlines. Numerical ex- amples demonstrate that whether the two airlines offer callable products and whether offering callable products is beneficial to the two airlines mainly depends on their loads and capacities. Specifically, when the difference between the loads of the airlines is large, the loads of the airlines play the most important role. When the difference between the loads of the airlines is small, the capacities of the airlines play the most important role. Moreover, numerical examples show that the booking limits of the two airlines in the case with callable products are always higher than those in the case without callable products.