Multivariate cryptography is one of the main candidates to guarantee the security of communication in the presence of quantum computers. While there exist a large number of secure and efficient multivariate signature schemes, the number of practical multivariate encryption schemes is somewhat limited. In this paper we present our results on creating a new multivariate encryption scheme, which is an extension of the original SimpleMatrix encryption scheme of PQCrypto 2013. Our scheme allows fast en- and decryption and resists all known attacks against multivariate cryptosystems. Furthermore, we present a new idea to solve the decryption failure problem of the original SimpleMatrix encryption scheme.

The Hidden Field Equations (HFE) Cryptosystem as proposed by Patarin is one of the best known and most studied multivariate schemes. While the security of the basic scheme appeared to be very weak, the HFEv- variant seems to be a good candidate for digital signature schemes on the basis of multivariate polynomials. However, the currently existing scheme of this type, the QUARTZ signature scheme, is hardly used in practice because of its poor efficiency. In this paper we analyze recent results from Ding and Yang about the degree of regularity of HFEv- systems and derive from them design principles for signature schemes of the HFEv- type. Based on these results we propose the new HFEv- based signature scheme Gui, which is more than 100 times faster than QUARTZ and therefore highly comparable with classical signature schemes such as RSA and ECDSA.

In this paper, we present a practical and provably secure two-pass authenticated key exchange protocol over ideal lattices, which is conceptually simple and has similarities to the Diffie-Hellman based protocols such as HMQV (CRYPTO 2005) and OAKE (CCS 2013). Our method does not involve other cryptographic primitives—in particular, it does not use signatures—which simplifies the protocol and enables us to base the security directly on the hardness of the ring learning with errors problem. The security is proven in the Bellare-Rogaway model with weak perfect forward secrecy in the random oracle model. We also give a one-pass variant of our two-pass protocol, which might be appealing in specific applications. Several concrete choices of parameters are provided, and a proof-of-concept implementation shows that our protocols are indeed practical.

In this article, the authors cryptanalyze a k-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocol proposed in [12]. Their protocol is one of the most efficient k-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocols and is directly built from a 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocol. However, their analysis shows that the proposed k-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocol is insecure, though the primitive 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocol is secure. The weakness is that with high probability the receiver in their protocol can get all n secret messages encrypted by the sender. Finally, they fix the serious flaw and introduce an improved k-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocol without increasing any cost.

In this paper, we prove that the degree of regularity of square systems, a subfamily of the HFE systems, over a prime finite field of odd characteristic q is exactly q and, therefore, prove that inverting square systems algebraically using Gröbner basis algorithm is exponential, when q = \Omega(n), where n is the number of variables of the system.