Inthisarticle,weprovideasufficientandnecessaryconditiononparabolic isometries of positive translation lengths on complete visibility CAT(0) spaces. One of the consequences is that each parabolic isometry of a complete simply connected visibility manifold of nonpositive sectional curvature has zero translation length. Applications on the geometry of open negatively curved manifolds will also be discussed.

In a (t,n) threshold scheme any t or more shares can reconstruct the secret s, but less than t shares reveal no information about s. However, an unauthenticated adversary can pretend to be the shareholder at the reconstruction stage. If there were more than t honest shareholders, the unauthenticated adversary without valid share can obtain the secret. To deal with this type of attacks, a model of (t,m,n) group oriented secret sharing (GOSS) scheme was proposed by Miao et al. in 2015. Here the group oriented property means that if m>t parties try to reconstruct the secret, they should all have the authentic shares in advance. It was claimed by Miao et al. that the group oriented property in their GOSS schemes holds in the information-theoretic sense. In this paper, we revisit two instantiations of (t,m,n) group oriented secret sharing schemes and show that these constructions cannot provide the so-called “group oriented property”. Specifically, we develop concrete attacks which allow an unauthenticated adversary with no valid share to participate in the reconstruction phase and obtain the secret provided that there are at least t honest shares presented at the reconstruction phase.

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We develop a generic game platform that can be used to model various real-world systems with multiple intelligent cloud-computing pools and parallel-queues for resources-competing users. Inside the platform, the software structure is modelled as Blockchain. All the users are associated with Big Data arrival streams whose random dynamics is modelled by triply stochastic renewal reward processes (TSRRPs). Each user may be served simultaneously by multiple pools while each pool with parallel- servers may also serve multi-users at the same time via smart policies in the Blockchain, e.g. a Nash equilibrium point myopically at each fixed time to a game-theoretic scheduling problem. To illustrate the effectiveness of our game platform, we model the performance measures of its internal data flow dynamics (queue length and workload processes) as reflecting diffusion with regime-switchings (RDRSs) under our scheduling policies. By RDRS models, we can prove our myopic game-theoretic policy to be an asymptotic Pareto minimal-dual-cost Nash equilibrium one globally over the whole time horizon to a randomly evolving dynamic game problem. Iterative schemes for simulating our multi-dimensional RDRS models are also developed with the support of numerical comparisons.

The public key of the Oil-Vinegar scheme consists of a set of m quadratic equations in m + n variables over a finite field F_q. Kipnis and Shamir broke the balanced Oil-Vinegar scheme where d = n − m = 0 by finding equivalent keys of the cryptosytem. Later their method was extended by Kipnis et al to attack the unbalanced case where 0 < d < m and d is small with a complexity of O(q^{d−1} m^4). This method uses the matrices associated with the quadratic polynomials in the public key, which needs to be symmetric and invertible. In this paper, we give an optimized search method for Kipnis el al’s attack. Moreover, for the case that the finite field is of characteristic 2, we find the situation becomes very subtle, which, however, was totally neglected in the original work of Kipnis et al. We show that the Kipnis-Shamir method does not work if the field characteristic is 2 and d is a small odd number, and we fix the situation by proposing an alternative method and give an equivalent key recovery attack of complexity O(q^{d+1} m^4). We also prove an important experimental observation by Ding et al for the Kipnis-Shamir attack on balanced Oil-Vinegar schemes in characteristic 2.