No abstract uploaded!

No abstract uploaded!

No abstract uploaded!

Recently, Tsai-Tseng-Yau constructed new invariants of symplectic manifolds: a sequence of A-infinity algebras built of differential forms on the symplectic manifold. We show that these symplectic A-infinity algebras have a simple topological interpretation. Namely, when the cohomology class of the symplectic form is integral, these A-infinity algebras are equivalent to the standard de Rham differential graded algebra on certain odd dimensional sphere bundles over the symplectic manifold. From this equivalence, we deduce for a closed symplectic manifold that Tsai-Tseng-Yau's symplectic A-infinity algebras satisfy the Calabi-Yau property, and importantly, that they can be used to define an intersection theory for coisotropic/isotropic chains. We further demonstrate that these symplectic A-infinity algebras satisfy several functorial properties and lay the groundwork for addressing Weinstein functoriality and invariance in the smooth category.

Research on key mismatch attacks against lattice-based KEMs is an important part of the cryptographic assessment of the ongoing NIST standardization of post-quantum cryptography. There have been a number of these attacks to date. However, a unified method to evaluate these KEMs’ resilience under key mismatch attacks is still missing. Since the key index of efficiency is the number of queries needed to successfully mount such an attack, in this paper, we propose and develop a systematic approach to find lower bounds on the minimum average number of queries needed for such attacks. Our basic idea is to transform the problem of finding the lower bound of queries into finding an optimal binary recovery tree (BRT), where the computations of the lower bounds become essentially the computations of a certain Shannon entropy. The optimal BRT approach also enables us to understand why, for some lattice-based NIST candidate KEMs, there is a big gap between the theoretical bounds and bounds observed in practical attacks, in terms of the number of queries needed. This further leads us to propose a generic improvement method for these existing attacks, which are confirmed by our experiments. Moreover, our proposed method could be directly used to improve the side-channel attacks against CCA-secure NIST candidate KEMs.