In Nash bargaining problem, due to fairness concerns of players, instead of maximizing the sum of utilities of all players, an implementable solution should satisfy some axioms or characterizations. Such a solution can result in the so-called price of fairness, because of the reduction in the sum of utilities of all players. An important issue is to quantify the system efficiency loss under axiomatic solutions through the price of fairness. Based on Perles–Maschler solution of two-player Nash bargaining problem, this paper deals with the extended Perles–Maschler solution of multi-player Nash bargaining problem.We give lower bounds of threemeasures of the system efficiency for this solution, and show that the lower bounds are asymptotically tight.

We show that the symmetrized bidisc may be exhausted by strongly linearly convex domains. It shows in particular the existence of a strongly linearly convex domain that cannot be exhausted by domains biholomorphic to convex ones.

Let $\mathcal{M} =\{m_{j}\}_{j=1}^{\infty}$ be a family of Marcinkiewicz multipliers of sufficient uniform smoothness in $\mathbb{R}^{n}$ . We show that the$L$^{$p$}norm, 1<$p$<∞, of the related maximal operator $$M_Nf(x)= \sup_{1\leq j \leq N} |\mathcal{F}^{-1} ( m_j \mathcal{F} f)|(x) $$ is at most$C$(log($N$+2))^{$n$/2}. We show that this bound is sharp.

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