In this paper we consider the computational complexity of uniformizing a domain with a given computable boundary. We give nontrivial upper and lower bounds in two settings: when the approximation of the boundary is given either as a list of pixels, or by a Turing machine.

It is well known that the second-order cone and the circular cone have many analogous properties. In particular, there exists an important distance inequality associated with the second-order cone and the circular cone. The inequality indicates that the distances of arbitrary points to the second-order cone and the circular cone are equivalent, which is crucial in analyzing the tangent cone and normal cone for the circular cone. In this paper, we provide an alternative approach to achieve the aforementioned inequality. Although the proof is a bit longer than the existing one, the new approach offers a way to clarify when the equality holds. Such a clarification is helpful for further study of the relationship between the second-order cone programming problems and the circular cone programming problems.

A classical set of birational invariants of a variety are its spaces of pluricanonical forms and some of their canonically defined subspaces. Each of these vector spaces admits a typical metric structure which is also birationally invariant. These vector spaces so metrized will be referred to as the pseudonormed spaces of the original varieties. A fundamental question is the following: Given two mildly singular projective varieties with some of the first variety9s pseudonormed spaces being isometric to the corresponding ones of the second variety9s, can one construct a birational map between them that induces these isometries? In this work, a positive answer to this question is given for varieties of general type. This can be thought of as a theorem of Torelli type for birational equivalence.

The Matsumoto-Imai (MI) cryptosystem was the first multivariate public key cryptosystem proposed for practical use. Though MI is now considered insecure due to Patarin’s linearization attack, the core idea of MI has been used to construct many variants such as Sflash, which has recently been accepted for use in the New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption project. Linearization attacks take advantage of the algebraic structure of MI to produce a set of equations that can be used to recover the plaintext from a given ciphertext. In our paper, we present a solution to the problem of finding the dimension of the space of linearization equations, a measure of how much work the attack will require.

No abstract uploaded!