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No abstract uploaded!

In this paper, we present a practical and provably secure two-pass authenticated key exchange protocol over ideal lattices, which is conceptually simple and has similarities to the Diffie-Hellman based protocols such as HMQV (CRYPTO 2005) and OAKE (CCS 2013). Our method does not involve other cryptographic primitives—in particular, it does not use signatures—which simplifies the protocol and enables us to base the security directly on the hardness of the ring learning with errors problem. The security is proven in the Bellare-Rogaway model with weak perfect forward secrecy in the random oracle model. We also give a one-pass variant of our two-pass protocol, which might be appealing in specific applications. Several concrete choices of parameters are provided, and a proof-of-concept implementation shows that our protocols are indeed practical.

We show that a compact, connected set which has uniform oscillations at all points and at all scales has dimension strictly larger than 1. We also show that limit sets of certain Kleinian groups have this property. More generally, we show that if$G$is a non-elementary, analytically finite Kleinian group, and its limit set Λ($G$) is connected, then Λ($G$) is either a circle or has dimension strictly bigger than 1.