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We adapt the Douglas–Rachford (DR) splitting method to solve nonconvex feasibility problems by studying this method for a class of nonconvex optimization problem. While the convergence properties of the method for convex problems have been well studied, far less is known in the nonconvex setting. In this paper, for the direct adaptation of the method to minimize the sum of a proper closed function g and a smooth function f with a Lipschitz continuous gradient, we show that if the step-size parameter is smaller than a computable threshold and the sequence generated has a cluster point, then it gives a stationary point of the optimization problem. Convergence of the whole sequence and a local convergence rate are also established under the additional assumption that f and g are semi-algebraic. We also give simple sufficient conditions guaranteeing the boundedness of the sequence generated. We then apply our nonconvex DR splitting method to finding a point in the intersection of a closed convex set C and a general closed set D by minimizing the squared distance to C subject to D. We show that if either set is bounded and the step-size parameter is smaller than a computable threshold, then the sequence generated from the DR splitting method is actually bounded. Consequently, the sequence generated will have cluster points that are stationary for an optimization problem, and the whole sequence is convergent under an additional assumption that C and D are semi-algebraic. We achieve these results based on a new merit function constructed particularly for the DR splitting method. Our numerical results indicate that our DR splitting method usually outperforms the usual DR splitting method and the alternating projection method in finding a sparse solution of a linear system, in terms of both the solution quality and the number of iterations taken.

This paper studies the capacity allocation game between duopolistic airlines which could offer callable products. Previous literature has shown that callable products provide a riskless source of additional rev- enue for a monopolistic airline. We examine the impact of the introduction of callable products on the revenues and the booking limits of duopolistic airlines. The analytical results demonstrate that, when there is no spill of low-fare customers, offering callable products is a dominant strategy of both airlines and provides Pareto gains to both airlines. When customers of both fare classes spill, offering callable products is no longer a dominant strategy and may harm the revenues of the airlines. Numerical ex- amples demonstrate that whether the two airlines offer callable products and whether offering callable products is beneficial to the two airlines mainly depends on their loads and capacities. Specifically, when the difference between the loads of the airlines is large, the loads of the airlines play the most important role. When the difference between the loads of the airlines is small, the capacities of the airlines play the most important role. Moreover, numerical examples show that the booking limits of the two airlines in the case with callable products are always higher than those in the case without callable products.

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