This paper focuses on pricing and vertical cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain. Using a Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer acts as the game leader and the retailer acts as the game follower, we obtain closed-form equilibrium solution and explicitly show how pricing and advertising decisions are made. When market demand decreases exponentially with respect to the retail price and increases with respect to national and local advertising expenditures in an additive way, the manufacturer benefits from providing percentage reimbursement for the retailer’s local advertising expenditure when demand price elasticity is large enough. Whether the manufacturer benefits from cooperative advertising is also closely related to supply chain member’s relative advertising efficiency. In the decision for adopting coop advertising strategy, it is critical for the manufacturer to identify how market demand depends on national and local advertisements. The findings from this research can enhance our understanding of cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain with price-dependent demand.

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Finding a fixed point to a nonexpansive operator, i.e., x = Tx, abstracts many problems in numerical linear algebra, optimization, and other areas of data sciences. To solve xed- point problems, we propose ARock, an algorithmic framework in which multiple agents (machines, processors, or cores) update x in an asynchronous parallel fashion. Asynchrony is crucial to parallel computing since it reduces synchronization wait, relaxes communication bottleneck, and thus speeds up computing significantly. At each step of ARock, an agent updates a randomly selected coordinate xi based on possibly out-of-date information on x. The agents share x through either global memory or communication. If writing xi is atomic, the agents can read and write x without memory locks. We prove that if the nonexpansive operator T has a fixed point, then with probability one, ARock generates a sequence that converges to a fixed point of T. Our conditions on T and step sizes are weaker than comparable work. Linear convergence is obtained under suitable assumptions. We propose special cases of ARock for linear systems, convex optimization, machine learning, as well as distributed and decentralized consensus problems. Numerical experiments of solving sparse logistic regression problems are presented.

We consider the problem of minimizing the sum of a smooth function h with a bounded Hessian and a nonsmooth function. We assume that the latter function is a composition of a proper closed function P and a surjective linear map M. This problem is nonconvex in general and encompasses many important applications in engineering and machine learning. In this paper, we examined two types of splitting methods for solving this nonconvex optimization problem: the alternating direction method of multipliers and the proximal gradient algorithm. For the direct adaptation of the alternating direction method of multipliers, we show that if the penalty parameter is chosen sufficiently large and the sequence generated has a cluster point, then it gives a stationary point of the nonconvex problem. We also establish convergence of the whole sequence under an additional assumption that the functions h and P are semialgebraic. Furthermore, we give simple sufficient conditions to guarantee boundedness of the sequence generated. These conditions can be satisfied for a wide range of applications including the least squares problem with the 1/2 regularization. Finally, when M is the identity so that the proximal gradient algorithm can be efficiently applied, we show that any cluster point is stationary under a slightly more flexible constant step-size rule than what is known in the literature for a nonconvex h. We illustrate our theoretical finding with a variety of applications such as signal denoising and sparse optimisation problems.

This paper studies the capacity allocation game between duopolistic airlines which could offer callable products. Previous literature has shown that callable products provide a riskless source of additional rev- enue for a monopolistic airline. We examine the impact of the introduction of callable products on the revenues and the booking limits of duopolistic airlines. The analytical results demonstrate that, when there is no spill of low-fare customers, offering callable products is a dominant strategy of both airlines and provides Pareto gains to both airlines. When customers of both fare classes spill, offering callable products is no longer a dominant strategy and may harm the revenues of the airlines. Numerical ex- amples demonstrate that whether the two airlines offer callable products and whether offering callable products is beneficial to the two airlines mainly depends on their loads and capacities. Specifically, when the difference between the loads of the airlines is large, the loads of the airlines play the most important role. When the difference between the loads of the airlines is small, the capacities of the airlines play the most important role. Moreover, numerical examples show that the booking limits of the two airlines in the case with callable products are always higher than those in the case without callable products.