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In this paper, we consider a class of penalized NCP-functions, which includes several existing well-known NCP-functions as special cases. The merit function induced by this class of NCP-functions is shown to have bounded level sets and provide error bounds under mild conditions. A derivative free algorithm is also proposed, its global convergence is proved and numerical performance compared with those based on some existing NCP-functions is reported.

We propose several modifications to the grid based particle method (GBPM) [21] for moving interface modeling. There are several nice features of the proposed algorithm. The new method can significantly improve the distribution of sampling particles on the evolving interface. Unlike the original GBPM where footpoints (sampling points) tend to cluster to each other, the sampling points in the new method tend to be better separated on the interface. Moreover, by replacing the grid-based discretization using the cell-based discretization, we naturally decompose the interface into segments so that we can easily approximate surface integrals. As a possible alternative to the local polynomial least square approximation, we also study a geometric basis for local reconstruction in the resampling step. We will show that such modification can simplify the overall implementations. Numerical examples in two- and three

In this paper, we study how the algebraic attack on the HFE multivariate public key cryptosystem works if we build an HFE cryptosystem on a finite field whose characteristic is not two. Using some very basic algebraic geometry we argue that when the characteristic is not two the algebraic attack should not be polynomial in the range of the parameters which are used in practical applications. We further support our claims with extensive experiments using the Magma implementation of F_4, which is currently the best publicly available implementation of the Gröbner basis algorithm. We present a new variant of the HFE cryptosystems, where we project the public key of HFE to a space of one dimension lower. This protects the system from the Kipnis-Shamir attack and makes the decryption process avoid multiple candidates for the plaintext. We propose an example for a practical application on GF(11) and suggest a test challenge on GF(7).

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