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This paper discusses how to solve filtering problem for a class of continuous nonlinear time-varying systems via Duncan-Mortensen-Zakai (DMZ) equation. In this paper, the original DMZ equation is changed into Kolmogorov forward equation (KFE) by exponential transformations in each time interval, and then under some assumptions, the KFE can be transformed into time-varying Schr\"odinger equation which can be solved explicitly. The novelty of this paper lies in how to transform the KFE into Schr\"odinger equation. As a direct application, the results of \cite{yau 2004} are extended for time-varying Yau systems.

This paper focuses on pricing and vertical cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain. Using a Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer acts as the game leader and the retailer acts as the game follower, we obtain closed-form equilibrium solution and explicitly show how pricing and advertising decisions are made. When market demand decreases exponentially with respect to the retail price and increases with respect to national and local advertising expenditures in an additive way, the manufacturer benefits from providing percentage reimbursement for the retailer’s local advertising expenditure when demand price elasticity is large enough. Whether the manufacturer benefits from cooperative advertising is also closely related to supply chain member’s relative advertising efficiency. In the decision for adopting coop advertising strategy, it is critical for the manufacturer to identify how market demand depends on national and local advertisements. The findings from this research can enhance our understanding of cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain with price-dependent demand.

This paper studies the inventory management problem of dual channels operated by one vendor. Demands of dual channels are inventory-level-dependent.We propose a multi-period stochastic dynamic programming model which shows that under mild conditions, the myopic inventory policy is optimal for the infinite horizon problem. To investigate the importance of capturing demand dependency on inventory levels, we consider a heuristic where the vendor ignores demand dependency on inventory levels, and compare the optimal inventory levels with those recommended by the heuristic. Through numerical examples, we show that the vendor may order less for dual channels than those recommended by the heuristic, and the difference between the inventory levels in the two cases can be so large that the demand dependency on inventory levels cannot be neglected. In the end, we numerically examine the impact of different ways to treat unmet demand and obtain some managerial insights.

This paper studies the eect of risk-aversion in the competitive newsvendor game. Multiple newsvendors with risk-averse preferences face a random demand and the demand is allocated proportionally to their inventory levels. Each newsvendor aims to maximize his expected utility instead of his expected prot. Assuming a general form of risk-averse utility function, we prove that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in this game, and it is also unique under certain conditions. We nd that the order quantity of each newsvendor is decreasing in the degree of risk-aversion and increasing in the initial wealth. Newsvendors with moderate preferences of risk-aversion make more prots compared with the risk-neutral situation. We also discuss the joint eect of risk-aversion and competition. If the eect of risk-aversion is strong enough to dominate the eect of competition, the total inventory level under competition will be lower than that under centralized decision-making.

This paper studies the capacity allocation game between duopolistic airlines which could offer callable products. Previous literature has shown that callable products provide a riskless source of additional rev- enue for a monopolistic airline. We examine the impact of the introduction of callable products on the revenues and the booking limits of duopolistic airlines. The analytical results demonstrate that, when there is no spill of low-fare customers, offering callable products is a dominant strategy of both airlines and provides Pareto gains to both airlines. When customers of both fare classes spill, offering callable products is no longer a dominant strategy and may harm the revenues of the airlines. Numerical ex- amples demonstrate that whether the two airlines offer callable products and whether offering callable products is beneficial to the two airlines mainly depends on their loads and capacities. Specifically, when the difference between the loads of the airlines is large, the loads of the airlines play the most important role. When the difference between the loads of the airlines is small, the capacities of the airlines play the most important role. Moreover, numerical examples show that the booking limits of the two airlines in the case with callable products are always higher than those in the case without callable products.

In Nash bargaining problem, due to fairness concerns of players, instead of maximizing the sum of utilities of all players, an implementable solution should satisfy some axioms or characterizations. Such a solution can result in the so-called price of fairness, because of the reduction in the sum of utilities of all players. An important issue is to quantify the system efficiency loss under axiomatic solutions through the price of fairness. Based on Perles–Maschler solution of two-player Nash bargaining problem, this paper deals with the extended Perles–Maschler solution of multi-player Nash bargaining problem.We give lower bounds of threemeasures of the system efficiency for this solution, and show that the lower bounds are asymptotically tight.

In this paper, we construct a new suboptimal filter by deriving the Ito's stochastic differential equations of the estimation of higher order central moments satisfy and imposing some conditions to form a closed system. The essentially infinite-dimensional cubic sensor problem has been investigated in detail numerically to illustrate the reasonableness of the imposed conditions, and the numerical experiments support our discussion. A 2-dimensional polynomial filtering problem has also been experimented.

In this paper we derive the stochastic differentials of the conditional central moments of the nonlinear filtering problems, especially those of the polynomial filtering problem, and develop a novel suboptimal method by solving this evolution equation. The basic idea is to augment the state of the original nonlinear system by including the original states' conditional central moments such that the augmented states form a so-called bilinear system after truncating. During our derivation, it is clear to see that the stochastic differentials of the conditional central moments of the linear filtering problem (i.e., $f$, $g$ and $h$ are all at most degree one polynomials) form a closed system automatically without truncation. This gives one reason for the existence of optimal filtering for linear problems. On the contrary, the conditional central moments form an infinite dimensional system, in general. To reduce it to a closed-form, we let all the high enough central moments to be zero, as one did in the Carleman approach \cite{GMP}. Consequently, a novel suboptimal method is developed by dealing with the bilinear system. Numerical simulation is performed for the cubic sensor problem to illustrate the accuracy and numerical stability.